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Executive summary 
Integration of a large share of intermittent RES&DG power generation, in particular wind, 
creates a number of problems for the electricity system in a country. These are mainly 
related to the unpredictability and variability of the power production. Reducing the impacts 
causes extra system costs for the system, if tackled in a traditional power system setting. 
But, if a number of technical rules and regulations are changed, market-based efficient 
integration of variable renewable energy technologies for electricity generation is possible. 
This report (D7) is analysing all measures and response options for changes in regulation 
and institutional setting per country. Furthermore, it formulates recommendations for 
improving the policy and regulatory framework in order to implement the response options, 
barriers for implementing them and the in five countries, required changes in regulatory, 
institutional and policy framework as identified in the earlier reports (D5 & D6). 
Distributed and renewable generation 
With larger penetration of intermittent type generation, in particular wind, also the impacts 
and, thus, the design of support schemes for promoting RES&DG becomes more important. 
Some of the DG/RES technologies – in particular CHP for larger heat distribution networks  – 
are able to contribute significantly to handle intermittency, e.g. by adding heat storages, heat 
pumps, or electric boilers for down-regulation. Replacing feed-in tariffs with premiums on 
market prices is an important measure to expose DG/RES technologies to market prices 
which reflect the system wide supply and demand for electricity. Consequently, DG/RES will 
adjust their production schedules and produce only when it has added value for the electricity 
system and society as a whole. Commercial aggregators with a portfolio of small generating 
units will play a more and more important role on the market, e.g. in the form of ‘virtual power 
plants’. Also, the design of markets is important. Market splitting – following the principles 
from the Nordic electricity exchange, Nord Pool – into geographical areas with transmission 
constraints to neighbouring areas and large penetration of intermittent generation will create 
market prices that will encourage generators to contribute to system stability. Finally, 
technical requirements set up in the national grid codes such as fault-ride through capability 
should also be applied to small generators. 
Conventional generation 
In general, variable type of DG/RES will reduce the utilisation of existing and planned 
conventional units. This may create financial problems for owners (i.e. utility companies) and 
discourage their investment in new capacity. In addition, conventional generators will also 
have to face market incentives or legal obligations to supply balancing power and ancillary 
services, when needed by the electricity market. All and all, much of the extra system 
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requirements caused by variable DG/RES could lead to an extra burden for the conventional 
generators and their owners. 
The main recommendation for increasing capacity firmness and investment in conventional 
generation will be that support schemes for maintaining existing conventional capacity should 
be considered in relation with existing support schemes for DG/RES. The location of new 
units is also an important factor. In particular, the existence of urban district heating grids or 
the potentials for the development of large urban grids from existing heating systems should 
be accounted for when tendering for new units and their site. Furthermore, one should note 
that some investment in new capacity intensive base-load systems (e.g., nuclear, carbon 
capture and storage – CCS) are highly depend on political decisions and strong support from 
the industry rather than market incentives. 
In some situations the installation of base-load capacity rather than peaking plants might not 
be a sufficient guarantee to provide the flexibility that is needed in the future systems. 
Consequently, the required suitable capacity needs to be pushed through extra regulatory 
measures. Already now, market mechanisms in the form of annual, monthly or daily auctions 
may be used for reserve capacity, which may encourage contingency units or autoproducers 
with low utilisation time to contribute to peak load. In some cases, new capacity built for peak 
load may be needed. 
Demand response 
The functionality and a common standard for consumption meters should be decided upon 
as soon as possible. This to facilitate a timely development of a scheme for a general roll-out 
of meters, including an option to introduce simple meters, but to prepare these in advance for 
upgrades to so called “intelligent meters” that may receive signals and control the 
consumption of specific appliances. If intelligent meters should be an interesting option 
,centrally controlled operation and updates of the software controling the functioning of the 
meter are necessary. 
Customers should be charged the marginal cost of production and delivery of electricity to 
individual customers. Given hourly metering day-ahead prices in the market appear 
reasonable, giving the customer time to plan its consumption. If intelligent meters and price 
controlled cut-off units are installed, real time pricing and automatic response is an option. If 
congestion in the network implies local differences in supply/delivery costs than the 
consumer prices should also reflect these cost differences. Fixed price-additives should be 
reduced and as much as possible and changed into percent additives on the hourly prices. 
And this will increase the volatility of annual revenues and bills to be paid by customers. 
Enabling technologies that increase demand flexibility fall in two categories: Control 
technologies and technologies that increase the share of flexible demand. In the medium 
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term, technologies and communication standards should be developed for control 
technologies, while demonstration projects showing benefits and needed improvements can 
and should be carried out in the short term.  
Concerning additional flexible demand, in the short term, heating and storage of heat is a 
relatively cheap option. In the medium and long term, other storage facilities and electrical 
vehicles (as demand load management tool) are promising technologies. Especially 
concerning the application of electric vehicles, the controllability of charging and possibly 
discharging of batteries is an important issue to solve first. 
National Markets 
The key instruments for integration of DG/RES are the electricity spot markets, which have 
been developed in several countries or regional groups of countries over the last two 
decades. These markets were not developed to support DG/RES, but as an instrument to 
introduce competition into the electricity supply industry, which should lead to less 
institutional and technological conservatism. There has been a dynamic development of the 
electricity markets in Europe. These markets have been able to accommodate the various 
new technologies. Further developments are being planned, often to facilitate the integration 
of distributed technologies and improve competition. Also the international integration of the 
markets is under development. However, in the short and medium term European 
harmonisation of rules may be premature or even counterproductive for the successful 
integration of European electricity markets. So far, the practical experience of the market 
participants is limited, and methods to analyse market results are yet to be developed. 
The larger penetration of intermittent generation requires increasing the availability of 
balancing energy and the provision of reserve capacity, in order to guarantee the security 
and the reliability of the electricity system. Thus, the entrance of new flexible generation 
should be encouraged, as well as, an increase of the flexibility in the generation units that are 
already in operation, and also, of the demand. On the other hand, different options at 
European level are proposed to achieve possible reduction in local and total European needs 
for balancing such as the improvement of balancing coordinated actions among TSOs and 
the development of cross-border trading reserves. 
Regional Markets 
In order to achieve well functioning regional markets, new regional transmission lines would 
have to be built. To overcome the opposition of local people and authorities to the 
construction of these lines because of environmental reasons, which is a particular problem 
in the UK and Spain, could require – in the short to medium term – devoting congestion rents 
corresponding to other cross-border lines to their construction. Besides, benefits of the 
construction of these lines could be better explained. In the long term, some of these lines 
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could be buried. An efficient inter-TSO payment scheme should be used to allocate the cost 
of interconnection lines, at least in the medium term. This would also allow authorities to 
overcome the opposition of those countries crossed by these lines that are not significantly 
benefitted by them, which represents a significant obstacle in Spain, the UK and the 
Netherlands. Side payments could also be paid to these countries, and in the long term, 
strong regional authorities could be left in charge of deciding over the construction of these 
lines. The creation of these authorities would speed up the process of obtaining permits for 
the construction of interconnectors (an issue in Spain, the UK and Denmark), together with 
the identification of a single entity within each country with jurisdiction over the approval of 
this type of lines, and applying efficient congestion management mechanism at regional level 
would render the construction of these lines more interesting to the region, which is for 
example demanded by parties in the UK. 
In order to promote the coordination in the functioning of national markets within a region, 
coordinated implicit auctions are a useful instrument, possible to be implemented in the long 
term, to allocate regional short run transmission capacity. Consequently, complaints about 
the inefficiency of the methods and bureaucratic decision process presently heard in Spain, 
Germany and the Netherlands, might be effectively addressed. In the long term, an 
instrument as coordinated explicit auctions run by a central auctioneer should be used 
together with firm transmission rights. This seems to be a measure that needs to be 
implemented in all the countries considered in the study. 
Transmission grid 
Another solution for reducing a shortage of transmission capacity is applying locationally and 
temporally differentiated transmission charges, which stimulate a more efficient allocation of 
the cost of lines. Tariffs should be zonal and computed for each operation profile and 
technology in order not to become too volatile. Demonstration projects and marketing of this 
solution should be used to avoid the perception that these charges are discriminatory (an 
issue in Denmark, Germany and The Netherlands). To avoid support payments rendering 
transmission charges useless (issue in Spain and other countries), premiums instead of FITs 
should be pursued and the level of these premiums should be commensurated with the DG 
penetration level to be achieved. Most, if not all, these measures could be implemented in 
the medium term where shares of intermittent RES-E is expected to increase fast. Finally, 
generally in the medium term, existing methods to compute these tariffs should be replaced 
by simple ones used to compute charges in a limited number of zones and for a limited 
number of operation profiles.  
Regarding the construction of new transmission lines, lines could be buried in densely 
populated areas, in order to reduce their possible impact on human health (perceived as a 
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obstacle in the Netherlands, Spain and Germany). In order to do this, more efficient methods 
to bury lines could be developed and lines could be combined with other infrastructures 
(water, rail etc routes). Both measures will have an impact in the medium and long term. 
Besides, efficient cost allocation methods, based on beneficiaries theory, should be used to 
compute transmission charges in those countries where inefficiency problems are regarded a 
barrier (the UK). Transmission capacity in the UK should be allocated through more efficient 
coordinated market based methods, including efficient cost allocation methods. This 
instrument could be implemented in other countries in the medium term too. Finally, in order 
to ensure the profitability of network reinforcements in countries like the UK, the network 
expansion should be planned by a company, i.e. the TSO, with a public mandate to look after 
the satisfactory functioning of the system, using moderate cost reduction incentives. This 
instrument could be applied in other countries too and already in the medium term. 
As for the necessary increase in the efficiency of congestion management methods, which 
has been considered an issue in Spain, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK, creating a 
central auctioneer in the region to allocate capacity on regional congested corridors would be 
the best alternative, though it would require making significant changes to regulation and 
might take some time to be implemented. Another possibility for addressing regional trade 
would be running an iterative market clearing process, which, nevertheless, would be (a too) 
complex process. As for internal congestion that occurs systematically, predetermined 
factors affecting the system price would allow one to compute the price in each area, similar 
to the market splitting method used by the Nordic power exchange Nord Pool.  
Distribution grid 
Introducing an instrument as “shallow connection charges with locational and temporal 
content” for addressing the issue of capacity bottlenecks seems necessary. However, this 
instrument is currently incompatible with national regulation in countries like Germany, the 
Netherlands and Spain. In order to solve this problem, major changes would have to be 
made to the electricity laws or locational signals would have to be sent through other means 
like DG/RES support payments. These could be applied in the short to medium term, 
depending on the shares of variable DG/RES. Another issue, in the Netherlands as well as 
other countries, is the volatility that these charges are believed to have. However, applying 
zonal tariffs that are only updated periodically could solve this objection.  
Next step in improving the efficiency of DSO network planning and load management is 
providing incentives to DSOs for adopting the concept of “Active network management” 
(ANM). To overcome (in the Netherlands, UK, Germany and Denmark) the lack of reliable 
estimates of the individual impact of DG/RES connection and use of network (energy losses 
and quality of service), reference models to estimate the impacts can be used. DG may also 
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have impacts on other system variables and performance indexes that all affect the DSOs’ 
remuneration. Developing the enabling technologies to implement ANM is seen as a urgent 
necessity in Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and Denmark. This to deal with large scale 
connections of DG/RES to distribution grids. One could include these R&D costs in the 
regulated remuneration of DSO companies, so using higher rates of return than usual or/and 
pass-through of these costs to tariffs can solve that hurdle. Apart from this, the regulatory 
period before efficiency gains are included in tariffs (producing a reduction of these tariffs) 
could be extended. Measures to stimulate AMNs could be applied in the short term. 
Finally, when trying to get DSOs to include DG (and its positive effects) in network planning, 
in Spain and the Netherlands, the authorities have again found it difficult to compute the 
revenues of DSOs when considering DG. Here again, reference network models could be 
used and the DSO should also keep part of the efficiency gains for themselves (at least in 
the first regulatory period). And in relation hereto to prevent RES support payments from 
interfering with the controllability of DG by DSOs (issue in Spain and the Netherlands)  
premiums instead of FITs should be applied. These premiums should also exhibit some kind 
of temporal differentiation. All measure to be applied in the short term.  
Overall conclusion 
The current liberalised electricity market has created an institutional structure of the 
electricity supply with an open and much more dynamic developments than in the previous 
organisation of the power industry. A new market environment with fewer traditional barriers 
but needing many other changes in the market competition and network regulation to secure 
also in the future a reliable and secure electricity supply to the customers in all EU countries. 
The spot and balancing markets are changed and adapted continuously in many countries to 
meet the new needs of the electricity system with increasing and large shares of intermittent 
type of RES generation and distributed technologies. 
However, several system conditions mostly based on the past conventional generation and 
supply of electricity must be altered or changed to favour the integration of much more 
DG/RES. Generally, most of the measures proposed can be summarised and categorised as 
measures or regulation for: 
• Increasing the flexibility of conventional generation, i.e. hydro power with reservoirs 
and gas fuelled plants. 
• Constructing more transmission capacity. 
• Enhance response capabilities by peak load units and heat distribution systems 
supplied by CHP. 
• Establish commercial aggregators to develop ‘virtual power plants’. 
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• Establish geographical price areas for spot and balancing markets to provide price 
signals for demand response and network congestion management. 
• Regulation for proper pricing for incentivising demand response and Active Network 
Management by DSOs. 
All measures proposed here are used in the next report to develop Regulatory Roadmaps for 
the countries considered in the RESPOND project. These can support authorities and 
institutions in the different countries to implement measures to facilitate absorbing larger 
shares of variable DG/RES technologies.  
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1 Introduction 
The RESPOND project aims at identifying efficient market response options that actively 
contribute to an economic efficient integration of (intermittent) Renewable Energy Sources 
(RES) and Distributed Generation (DG) in the European electricity system. Furthermore, the 
project develops and formulates recommendations for improving the policy and regulation 
framework in five EU countries (Denmark, Germany, The Netherlands, Spain and the UK, 
etc) for effectively support implementing these market response options. In brief the 
objectives are to:  
• Evaluate the impacts of an increasing penetration of intermittent type of RES and DG 
generation and electricity supply on the system;  
• Identify and analyse efficient response options of market participants that actively 
support an efficient integration of these variable RES and DG in the electricity system;  
• Identify barriers and failures in market competition and regulation that hinder the 
necessary (system changes) response options to be developed and implemented by 
market participants. 
• Analyse, and assess improvements and changes of the policy and regulatory 
framework per country that facilitate the development and implementation of the 
recommended response options by market participants  
• Formulate recommendations and a roadmap per country for implementing these 
regulatory, system technical and institutional improvements 
More precisely RESPOND project study focuses its attention on the current most important 
intermittent technologies, i.e. micro-CHP and photovoltaic (PV) (on low voltage networks in 
both urban and rural areas), off-shore wind generation (on extra high voltage networks) and 
on-shore wind generation (on medium and high voltage networks in rural areas).  
So far the RESPOND project (deliverable D4) has reviewed and assessed the most 
important technical and economic (costs) impacts relate to the variability and the 
unpredictability of generation from intermittent energy sources (DG, RES, micro-CHP, PV) on 
the power systems from generation, via trade and balancing till consumption of electricity. 
Next the project (deliverable D5) has identified and classified a set of relevant technical and 
regulatory respond options to remove or reduce the previously identified negative system 
impacts of increasing DG/RES penetration, i.e. on generation, demand, markets and 
transmission and distribution networks. Important was also the part on unconventional 
response possibilities that arise in the dynamic electricity system including interaction 
between for example storage, demand response and market rules. The conditions and needs 
of the electricity system in five countries in 2020 are the focus in the study of these options.  
Finally analysed and assessed were (deliverable D6) the actual and potential barriers that 
may hinder the market participants implementing the identified respond options. For this 
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purpose, a detailed questionnaire was developed in order to expand and collect additional 
information for all the five countries, i.e. UK, Germany, Denmark Spain and the Netherlands. 
The barriers were placed in the context of the application of different options in different 
segments, i.e. generation (including both conventional generation and renewable and 
combined heat and power (RES/CHP) generation), demand of electricity, national and 
regional electricity markets, and finally transmission and distributions (T&D) networks.  
The present report D7 builds on the previous project results and has to identify, analyse and 
assess and recommend per country the most effective regulatory, technical and institutional 
measures or instruments that policy makers, regulators and governments may use to support 
the expected increasing penetration of intermittent type of RES-E (included herein DG type 
of RES-E) in the electricity markets in most EU MS. The focus is on measures that facilitate 
and will incentivise market parties (stakeholders) to invest, or come up with changes in 
market rules and commercial arrangements or market conform solutions (response options) 
that reduce the system cost expected to occur if the share of intermittent DG & RES-E is 
supplying electricity in 2020 or before. This report also serves as a key input to the 
development of a “Policy and regulatory roadmaps in five countries” being the final 
RESPOND report.  
The structure of the report D7 follows the same structure as used in the questionnaire (see 
D6). Starting with parts of questionnaire results from D6 and extending this with an 
elaborated analysis of regulation and current measure applied in the different five countries, 
UK, Germany, Spain, Denmark and the Netherlands result in D7. The chapters are per 
segment of the power system, from generation till demand, analysing all relevant options and 
measures/instruments to restructure the current power system in five countries in order to 
cope economic efficiently with large shares of intermittent DG/RES-E in the future. 
Consequently this report’s main interest is the contribution of RES-E/CHP technologies, 
which are also eligible for support schemes on improving the system’s capability to cope with 
increasing variable DG/RES shares in supply.  Generally we discuss the design of the RES-
E/CHP technologies and their functioning in the electricity markets, as they have developed 
so far and the prospects for this in short (before 2020) or in the medium (around 2020) and 
longer term (beyond 2020). The current obstacles that have been identified in the countries 
can be mitigated by a range of solutions that combine measures for RES-E/CHP, 
conventional generation, demand response, market organisation and expansion and 
management of transmission and distribution networks as are the recommendations in this 
report. In Chapter 2 recommendations for the RES-E/CHP technologies, which are eligible 
for various support schemes are presented. Both the design of the support schemes, the 
technical requirements to the technologies, and the design of the electricity markets may 
contribute to the further integration of RES-E/CHP. 
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Next, in Chapter 3, the measures are reviewed for conventional generators, who may still 
take most of the burden of balancing power and ancillary services. Chapter 4 describes 
recommendations for demand respond, which can be controlled to a further extent thus also 
contributing, together with generation to the further integration of RES-E/CHP. Chapter 5 is 
divided into two main parts. First part concerns an overview of the expected and required 
development of the main elements of the electricity markets, which are now generally found 
in most European countries particularly UK, Germany, Spain, Denmark and the Netherlands. 
Second part concerns recommended initiatives from national TSOs to facilitate further 
penetration of intermittent RES-E/CHP.  Furthermore in Chapter 6 the recommendations for 
regional markets both related to the development of physical international transmission lines 
and market organisation in the form of co-operation between the existing national and 
multinational electricity exchanges are formulated. Chapter 7 focuses on the development 
and operation of national transmission grids, which are operated by the TSOs. This includes 
recommendations for transmission tariffs, measures for grid reinforcement and public 
acceptance of grid expansion, and management of grid congestion.  
Chapter 8 focuses on the distribution networks, which are run by the DSOs. The 
recommendations relate to network charges, DSOs incentives for active network 
management, and DSOs incentive for taking into account DG in network planning and 
contribution to ancillary services by DG. 
Finally, Chapter 9 summarises the overall conclusions and recommendations of this report. 
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2 Distributed and renewable generation 
RESPOND focuses in the analysis on the most important intermittent technologies, mainly 
micro-CHP and photovoltaic (PV) (on low voltage networks in both urban and rural areas.), 
off-shore wind generation (on extra high voltage networks) and on-shore wind generation (on 
medium and high voltage networks in rural areas).  
Support schemes were and are important stimuli to encourage the penetration of these 
technologies in the here considered EU countries. The most important two of these schemes 
have been feed-in tariffs (FIT) and tradable green certificates (TGC). These have been 
successful in many European countries in terms of a significant penetration of some of these 
variable technologies, in particular that of wind turbines.  
The most important impacts on the electricity system relate to the variability and the 
unpredictability of generation from these intermittent energy sources. However, some of the 
RES-E/CHP technologies are also able to contribute significantly to handle intermittency 
issues. 
2.1 Price mechanisms and support schemes 
Given that a significant fraction of revenues obtained by RES/DG comes from support 
payments, the amount of investment in each of the different RES technologies is clearly 
dependent on the levels of these payments. Therefore, efficiently designing support 
payments is a prerequisite for achieving an economic market based integration of variable 
DG/RES generation. RESPOND project identified as a barrier for large-scale implementation 
of these technologies that, neither FITs applied in Spain and Germany, nor tradable green 
certificates implemented in the UK do not include location or the time of the day or the year 
when energy is produced by generators related signals. Consequently, the production profile 
of these generators does not adapt to the level of load to be covered or the – at that moment 
prevailing – conditions in the system1.  
When DG/RES generators are contributing to reduce variability in markets, they need 
appropriate regulation, business models and commercial experience to operate in the 
markets profitably. In practice, this means aggregation of units either in the form of ‘Virtual 
power plants’, focusing on both electricity generation and sale on the spot market, and 
providing reserves and ancillary services for balancing and ancillary services markets. These 
functions are closely linked, so the same companies (brokers or commercial aggregators) 
already often operating on all markets, either with a portfolio of similar units, e.g. wind 
 
1 In Spain, most of the wind production is sold in the daily energy market, whose hourly prices are 
related to the level of load to be covered in the system. 
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turbines or complementary units of different technologies. These companies also play an 
important role in the development of spot and balancing markets, national grid codes, 
software for strategic bidding on power exchanges, etc.  
RES/DG type of generators in some countries (e.g. Germany and Spain) are allowed to opt 
out of support schemes. In Spain, most of the wind production is sold in the daily energy 
market, whose hourly prices are related to the level of load to be covered in the system. In 
Denmark the production from older wind turbines, which are no longer eligible for FIT, is sold 
on the spot market by an aggregator, who is not BRP.  
The key recommendation for support schemes are to take into account of system needs and 
to replace feed-in tariffs with premiums for DG/RES generators, and also to encourage these 
generators to take part in the whole range of spot and balancing markets (adapt regulation to 
that aim if necessary). The market premium that is required in addition to the market prices  
differs between countries and may be as low as € 13 per MWh for wind generators as in 
Denmark. This is a relatively small amount compared to the annual average electricity price 
around € 50 per MWh or few hours with extreme values above € 100 per MWh.  
2.2 Technical capabilities for meeting system 
requirements 
In general, there exist no major technical hurdles that prevent DG/RES access to daily 
energy markets. This is owed to technical improvements in RES generation technology 
characteristics. However, participation of DG/RES in specific markets such as Ancillary 
Services (AS) one, is still limited to those units that meet certain requirements (regarding, 
mainly, controllability). Controllability of RES/DG units may be improved through the use of 
storage devices and the aggregation of units. Non-controllable units are capable of providing 
some kind of frequency response such as primary frequency control. However, in the 
Netherlands, Germany, and UK, small units connected to distribution networks do not have 
to provide reserve power. In Spain, the role of centralized control centres for the aggregation 
of RES/DG units is deemed necessary to facilitate the participation of units in reserve and 
balancing markets. In Denmark, a large number of small and medium scale CHP units take 
part in the spot and balancing market. 
The most prominent example of technical regulation that facilitates large-scale 
implementation of wind power is that of the grid codes for the five countries contain detailed 
but different requirements for fault ride through capability and voltage dips (also called 
voltage drops). These are different for units connected to different voltage levels (e.g. below 
and above 100 kV). For small thermal units the requirements vary with the capacity (e,g, in 
DK the limits are 11 kW and 1.5 MW). 
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The ability of modern wind turbines to regulate their production more easily than most 
thermal generators is an important contribution to the regulation capability that is needed for 
more penetration of intermittent generation. 
As general recommendation, we say that large wind turbines/parks should be equipped with 
regulation capabilities and have the possibility to participate in the market for AS and 
balancing.  
2.3 CHP generation with heat storages 
The RESPOND project considers also the role combined heat and power (CHP), in particular 
micro-CHP for individual households with electric capacities of a few kW. By some experts, it 
seen as a technology of the future, but which also requires considerable amounts of research 
and development of candidate technologies such as Sterling motors or fuel cells. CHP in 
scales from some hundreds kW are mature technologies, i.e. gas motors, and gas and steam 
turbines, which are widely used in sectors horticulture, industry and district heating. But what 
is defined as small-scale and large-scale may vary significantly among countries. In some 
countries CHP units above 1 MW will be called large-scale. In countries with significant use 
of CHP for district heating, large-scale CHP are conventional units with extraction facilities for 
large interconnected urban district heating grids, while units at 100 MW and below designed 
for a particular industry or district heating grid are small-scale CHP, distributed or 
decentralized CHP. Small-scale CHP are normally back-pressure units that generate 
electricity and heat in a fixed proportion. However, since heat storage is a relatively cheap 
option, CHP might also contribute to a more flexible production of electricity and heat by CHP 
and thus could play a role in enhancing the power system’s load flexibility in the future in 
countries having already those heating systems in place.  
2.3.1 Micro CHP 
CHP or micro-CHP might be considered as “intermittent” when run under heat-following 
control strategy. However, CHP systems could be potentially used as controllable if enough 
system incentives are available in order to provide such a grid services. This would increase 
the system flexibility, which is one of the key goals identified in the RESPOND project. In 
order to do so, suitable incentives or price signals should be designed and provided, which 
also require adequate and cheap communication infrastructure. In general, aggregation and 
control of several units by a centralized system at the distribution level would also help to 
select the most suitable units to provide grid support.  
Micro CHP seems to have become recently a viable energy generation option in the UK. The 
industry forecasts that micro-CHP can realistically take up to a 30% share of the boiler 
replacement market until 2015, which would imply 5.6 million homes could have micro CHP 
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installed by 2020. The electric capacities mentioned for micro CHP (1.1 and 3 kW) may 
represent different strategies for serving the annual heat demand in a normal household. 
Assuming a power-to heat ratio of 0.4, a small unit at 1.1kW electric will produce some 40 GJ 
heat in part load operation during 4000 equivalent full load hours. The same amount of heat 
can be produced assuming a power-to heat ratio of 1.1 for a larger unit at 3 kW in on-off 
operation using local heat storage.  
Widespread use would enable micro-CHP to contribute as a response option, rather than 
require balancing from conventional generation. However this also would require that a 
significant share of these installations have an operational overcapacity that will allow some 
flexibility in their electricity production.  
The only advantage of the micro-scale is that it does not require any enhanced infrastructure 
for heat distribution. The heat market for micro-CHP is enormous, and thus very attractive for 
industrial development. However, CHP technology has significant economies of scale, so 
expanding and interconnecting heat distribution systems to allow for larger scales of CHP 
units should be encourages or supported, when possible.  
2.3.2 Integrated local solutions 
Support schemes focusing on single DG/RES technologies may have a significant impact on 
that specific technology, i.e. wind. Other technologies require a more integrated approach 
that will involve both distributed generation, demand response, management of local grids, 
and operation on the spot (day-ahead and intraday) and balancing markets. 
In Germany, the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology has launched a programme 
“E-Energy: ICT-based Energy System of the Future” as part of the technology policy of the 
Federal Government. It stands for the comprehensive digital interconnection and computer-
based control and monitoring of the entire energy supply system. It was decided that the 
electricity sector would be the first area addressed by the project, as the challenges with 
regard to real-time interaction and computer intelligence are particularly high due to 
electricity’s limited ability to be stored. For a model region Cuxhaven in northern Germany an 
intelligent energy management system is currently used to strike a balance between the 
supply and consumption of electricity that is generated locally. This includes load shifting for 
a cool house and trade on the electricity market place to respond to market prices and 
possible transmission network constraints in an area with a large capacity of wind turbines. 
This example illustrates the important role of price signals for both generators and 
consumers. Price signals can encourage increases in system efficiency both in systems 
where transmission capacity is constrained and in those where it is not. Recommended are 
to develop methods such as in this example to let distributed generators and consumers face 
 21
                                                
such price signals, in particular in areas where large amounts of wind power are connected 
to the transmission or distribution grid.  
2.3.3 Market access for small-scale CHP generation with heat storages 
In Denmark a large number of small-scale CHP units with heat storage had been installed in 
the 1990s for medium and small-scale district heating systems. Initially, they faced a three-
level feed-in tariff that encouraged electricity generation at peak load only, but did not 
respond to the system needs caused by a significant capacity of wind power. To meet this 
last requirement CHP units above 10 MW were required to enter the market from 2005 and 
those above 5 MW from 2007. The process of market entry was prepared in collaboration 
between the TSO and six Balancing Responsible Parties (BRP), who are brokers or 
commercial aggregators, each leading a group of decentralized CHP plants.  
Bids for up and down regulation must be made in steps of 10 MW. This limit is reasonable, 
because small units are aggregated by BRP. The broker/BRP submits hourly (or shorter) 
forecasts for production and consumption. They operate integrated on the spot market (Nord 
Pool) and the balancing market (TSO). The process also involved the development of 
software for the bidding process.  
In conclusion, in all countries with a significant share of CHP there is a potential for flexible 
response, when the institutional setup is available to facilitate that. Establishing virtual power 
plants with commercial aggregators that operate on the spot market is strongly 
recommended to be introduced in the short term.  
2.4 Market design for large-scale wind integration 
Large shares of wind power have a significant impact on the system costs of producing 
electricity.  In most of the European electricity exchanges price quotations on the day-ahead, 
intraday and balancing markets represent figures for nations with large variations in the 
penetration of wind power. Danish price areas within the Nord Pool exchange area are 
different. The generation from wind power in the price areas Eastern and Western Denmark 
cover on an annual basis 16 and 25 percent of the electricity consumption, respectively.  
Detailed market data are available from energinet.dk since 2000. From 2006 all price data 
are available in EUR/MWh.  
An analysis of these data1 show that most hours with little or no wind are consecutive, so 
storages with only few hours capacity will be of little help. Longer periods (e.g. 12 hours or 
 
1 Appendix A contains a detailed analysis of the market result for the Western Denmark price area for 
the years 2006, 2007 and 2008. 
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more) with little or no wind will occur roughly once a month. The longest period with low wind 
that was found during the three years was 76 hours in November 2007. 
The analysis indicates that the balancing market is far more significant for dealing with the 
effects of intermittent generation than the intraday market. The balancing market seems not 
very important when the day-ahead area prices are high. On the other hand, there is a 
significant number of hours with ‘normal’ prices on the day-ahead market and up-regulation 
prices more than 100 €/MWh higher.  
In the short term, negative prices on the spot market have been considered as the most 
important additional measure to address the challenge of the large amount of intermittent 
generation. Negative prices were introduced on the German EEX spot market from 
September 2008, and from October 2009 a negative price floor at -200 €/MWh will be 
introduced at Nord Pool and APX.  
Negative prices will be an incentive for flexible generators to reduce their production – or 
consumers to use more – in few critical hours. Modern wind turbines are able to regulate 
their production more easily than most thermal generators. 
There are areas in Germany and Spain that have a larger penetration of wind than Western 
Denmark, but so far these regions are not identified as price areas in the electricity markets.  
2.5 Coping with variability and unpredictability by 
forecasting of RES-E/CHP generation 
The RESPOND project assumes that the most important impacts of RES-E/CHP relate to the 
variability and the unpredictability of generation by intermittent sources. Therefore also 
forecasting of RES-E/CHP generation is an important topic to discuss.  
Forecasting techniques are a promising tool to increase the flexibility of the balancing system 
and allow more effective planning of RES/CHP penetration and operation. In order to cope 
with DG/RES production variability, the capacity of interconnection with neighbouring 
countries should be increased. This would enable RES/CHP units to better handle their 
production domestically, even in the case of relatively badly forecasting from time to time the 
generated electricity. 
Again, aggregation – or the development of more sophisticated ‘virtual power plants’ – 
represents an important resource for market participation, since variations in the production 
of the equivalent aggregate unit will be smoother than those of individual units. In this case, 
the SO should send signals to each company central dispatching centre with the required 
services, and this dispatching centre should in turn sends the directive signals to its own 
units. 
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Wind power will be able to respond to system requirement in the short-term – in particular for 
a few seconds or within an hour. The main barrier is several hours with little or no wind. The 
only means to meet this situation is reduced demand or other generators. Most of these 
situations will be addressed within the day-ahead spot market. In addition, the intraday 
market with gate closure shortly before real time may be an important tool for RES-E/CHP to 
reduce their production forecast errors, and thus reduce their exposure to imbalance costs, 
This is possible even when the intraday market may have a low liquidity. However, the 
practical experience with the intraday market is still limited in regions with a large share of 
wind power..   
A situation with too much wind that stops a large number of wind turbines cannot be 
predicted very well with much certainty so far, but these situations are an exception. Also it is 
very unlikely that all turbines within one region stop at the same time. There will be time to 
activate other generators, and the TSO may increase the capacity for reserve capacity in 
daily auctions.  
Regional price areas reflecting permanent imbalances among regions within the same 
country shall apply not only to the balancing and ancillary services markets run by the TSOs, 
but also to the intra-day and day-ahead markets in order to set the appropriate price signals 
to both generators and consumers. The demand response to these price signals is discussed 
in Chapter 4, and their role for congestion management in the transmission network (implicit 
auctions) is discussed in Chapters 6 and 7. 
2.6 Recommendation on RES-E/CHP Generation 
Policy and regulatory recommendations to enable large-scale integration of renewable and 
distributed generation include also many technical requirements – typically implemented in 
national grid codes – which should allow new generators to meet requirements of to 
participate in the market, changes in market rules facilitating the participation of RES/DG 
generators and the creation of commercial companies with a portfolio of generators and 
consumers, who should operate virtual power plants or act as balance responsible parties to 
meet the needs of the electricity system.  
Short term implementation 
If not already implemented the following recommendations shall be considered for RES-
E/CHP generators in all countries. 
• Harmonisation of requirement for fault ride through capability, ability to overtake 
voltage dips, and controllability for all larger wind turbines in national grid codes. 
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• Control centres for groups of wind turbines or contracts with commercial aggregators 
operation as Balancing Responsible Parties for all larger RES-E/CHP units 
• Add heat storages, head pumps, or electric boilers for down-regulation to heat 
distribution networks supplied by CHP. 
• Training of small RES-E/CHP generators for market participation and dissemination 
of standardised software for operation and bidding on spot and balancing markets  
Medium-to-long-term implementation 
• FIT to be replaced by premiums on market prices, in particular when penetration of 
intermittent generation has reached a certain level in areas with limited transmission 
capacity to larger electricity markets. 
• Introduction of wholesale prices (as price signals for generators and consumers in 
regional price areas reflecting permanent imbalances among regions within the same 
country   
• Enhance forecasting methods and tools – in particular concerning the geographical 
distribution of wind power. 
• Expand and interconnect heat distribution networks to increase the flexibility of CHP 
units, heat storages etc.  
• Support schemes for micro-CHP that encourage units with surplus capacity and heat 
storage, which allows on-off operation following electricity market prices.  
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Table 2.1. Recommendations for applying RES-E/CHP for reducing intermittency impacts 
Market 
Response Barrier 
Recommendations 
Short term Medium term Long term 
Pricing 
mechanism 
No location-based 
charges/incentives for 
RES/CHP (SP, UK, NL) 
Introduction of regional price areas 
in spot and balance markets to 
reflect permanent imbalances 
among regions within the same 
country 
 
Pricing 
mechanism 
No ancillary service 
participation for FIT-based 
RES/CHP units (SP) 
Training of commercial 
aggregators.(BRP) and software 
development for participation in 
spot and balancing markets  
 
Pricing 
mechanism 
No compensation for 
load/frequency support for 
RES/CHP (NL, SP) 
Requirement in Grid Code for 
load/frequency support for larger 
RES-E/CHP 
 
Subsidy 
schemes 
No ToU-based FIT for 
RES/CHP (SP, DE) 
 Premiums on 
market prices 
instead of FIT. 
 
Subsidy 
schemes 
No ToU-based TGC for 
RES/CHP (UK) 
  
Regulation Disconnection of wind turbines 
at grid faults 
Harmonisation of Grid codes 
concerning voltage dips and fault 
ride through capability 
 
Regulation  Control centres for renewable 
energies  
 
Storage 
capacity 
Lack of response options Electric boilers 
for down 
regulation 
Expansion of district heating 
grids and heat markets in 
industry 
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3 Conventional generation 
In general, RES-E/CHP will reduce the utilisation of existing and future conventional units. 
This may create discourages investment in new capacity by utilities and other power 
generation companies. On the other hand, conventional generators will also face market 
incentives or legal obligations to supply balancing power and ancillary services, when 
needed by the electricity market. So much of the extra system requirements caused by RES-
E/CHP could end up as an extra “burden” for conventional generators. 
While CHP of a micro or small scale is one of technologies that are considered as distributed 
electricity and therefore often eligible for various support schemes, CHP in medium and large 
scale is considered as conventional generation technology but might in some countries being 
capable of offering the power system response if needed by the system due to large-scale 
penetration of intermittent generation technologies. 
Markets provide an incentive for generators to be available when the system needs them, 
since prices in these situations will be generally higher than normal. However, in some cases 
these price incentives may not be sufficient to ensure that enough generation capacity is able 
to produce when needed.  
The barriers that were identified in the RESPOND project concern the expectation of too little 
revenue from the sale of electricity and the provision of balancing and ancillary services to 
support the necessary conventional generation capacity. In Germany and UK there do not 
exist such availability payments, though these payments may be necessary when market 
incentives for firm capacity provision are not successful. However, these barriers are not 
necessarily caused by penetration of intermittent generation. Some additional payment 
beyond the revenues generated by the market may be necessary anyway, or additional 
market features should be added.  
3.1 Economic incentives to install new generation 
capacity or maintain the existing one 
In the presence of a considerable penetration of (intermittent type of) RES/CHP, investment 
in conventional generators might be endangered, as their overall market revenues might 
decrease, while specific (short time span) need is increasing. This may be especially true in 
systems where no additional capacity payment is allowed. Revenues for conventional 
generators decrease as the amount of their energy sales will decrease, since available 
RES/CHP production come first in the merit order. In addition, many conventional generators 
will have to operate far from their nominal functioning regime and they will have to cycle. 
Thus, their operating costs will increase. Consequently, investment in conventional 
generation may become less attractive. 
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The fact that some markets have traditionally operated with some overcapacity, so far, did 
hide this growing lack of conventional generation for this services until now.  
In the UK, in order for the system to meet capacity requirements, the SO approach is to 
publish the winter outlook and the “Seven Year Statement”, which has been sufficient to 
ensure development of an appropriate generation background to support demand.  
3.1.1 Investments beyond market incentives 
Investment in new, capital intensive base-load capacity, which generally also dependent on 
political and socio-economic and long term other considerations and needs the support from 
the power industry, is to a lesser extend following short term market incentives. For example, 
note the new nuclear investments in Finland, France and Lithuania. Another example is the 
aim for expanding fossil fuel generation capacity with carbon capture and storage (CCS). 
Additional mechanisms beyond market prices may be needed to achieve an efficient 
expansion of the generation capacity in the system. However, in many systems, like the UK 
or the Netherlands, extra payments outside the market to achieve the installation of new 
capacity are not allowed. As a consequence, periods of scarcity followed by other of excess 
capacity may occur. In the German system, and as a result of wrong incentive schemes, part 
of the conventional generation capacity installed is not thought to be well adapted to the role 
that this capacity may have to play in the future. Besides, capacity incentives in place in 
Spain have not been designed efficiently and capacity surges and scarcity may occur.  
Capacity payments outside the market aimed at providing system firmness implicitly push 
towards additional capacity. Indeed, on average such mechanisms increase the price earned 
by generation in place and thus give incentive to new investment. Mechanisms such as in 
Spain, where the payments are a function of the system reserve margin, could push 
investors to postpone investment too far away, in order to earn the maximum possible 
capacity payments.  
Implementation of such measures should be considered together with schemes for support 
of DG/RES and rules for competition among conventional and renewable technologies that 
address the targets of the European directives on CHP and renewable. The support 
schemes that are allowed in these directives are motivated by long-term environmental and 
security-of-supply issues. 
3.1.2 Capacity inherited from the past 
Most of the capacity that can react to price signals from the day-ahead market to meet the 
new requirements related to the existence of intermittent generation is neither new base load 
capacity nor peak load capacity, or capacity suitable to operate in part load far from their 
nominal functioning regime. The technical lifetime of power stations is several decades, 
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which means that most of the existing capacity was build in the past to meet requirements 
that were different from those in focus today.  
Few countries have the advantage of hydro power with abundant reservoir capacity, which is 
excellent to meet the requirements from intermittent generation within the framework of a 
modern electricity spot market. 
During the period of liberalisation in the last two decades conventional generators have 
invested mainly in gas-fired capacity based on a shorter time horizon and higher discount 
rate than during the previous time of regional vertically integrated monopolies. 
The remaining capacity inherited from the past is thermal units fuelled by coal, oil or gas, 
which are less efficient than similar units that are commissioned today or will be in the future. 
On an annual basis, they will operate on part load, often switching and far from their nominal 
functioning regime. This operation can be optimised using the price signals from the day-
ahead, intraday and balancing markets. 
There is a mix of such units in the five countries. Some technologies are capable of frequent 
starts and stops or running in part load; others must run constantly at best point with few 
starts and stops. However, for many units, if their actual operation is taking into account 
system needs this does not have to be much less efficient than the optimal operation of each 
type of units.  
The traditional utility companies operate as commercial aggregators for most of these units, 
and excess revenue may be earned as a result of their market power. The history of 
electricity liberalisation during the recent two decades tells about introduction of competition 
to break monopolies and reduce market power.  
3.2 Regulation and balancing reserves 
Main barriers to the provision of regulation reserves by conventional generation, which is 
necessary in order for the system to adapt (for reducing unwanted load impacts) of the 
variable output of intermittent RES generation, are twofold. First, in some countries like 
Germany, reserve prices are quite low compared to energy prices and conditions to be 
fulfilled in order to be eligible for the provision of reserves are rather complex. This 
discourages generators from providing these reserves, which may result, among other 
things, in less “liquid AS markets” than necessary for proper trade. In some other countries 
like Spain and Germany generators do not receive any payment for the provision of the 
primary frequency regulation service. 
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Conventional generation will probably remain the largest supply technology in all European 
countries in next two decades, i.e. a major part of the balancing obligation will remain to be 
provided by conventional generation. 
New capacity designated to respond to intermittent loads is not the only option for 
conventional generators to respond to intermittency. New conventional base-load capacity 
may be installed for many other reasons, and – as a side-effect – reduce the operation hours 
for less efficient existing capacity, which will be available for responding to intermittent 
generation.  
However, regulation or financial support may be needed to avoid to early decommissioning 
of capacity that might still needed as balancing reserve 
In Denmark there is large-scale CHP supply through large urban district heating grids. The 
large extraction-condensing units (250-500 MW) can shift between back-pressure (CHP) and 
condensing (electricity-only) modes. The volume of back-pressure mode follows the heat 
demand, while the operation in condensing mode is dependent of the electricity market as a 
complement to other generators. Of particular interest is their capability to increase the 
electricity output by some 15 % shifting from back-pressure to condensing mode. Most 
district heating systems are equipped with heat storages, which allow cut-off of heat supply 
for several hours. 
In the UK, large capacity of CCGTs plants was established in the 1990s, after privatisation 
wave, leading to the so called “The Dash for Gas”. This capacity may be too expensive to 
operate in base-load in the future, but it will be valuable as capacity for response to 
intermittent generation and ancillary services in the UK. 
In most countries, primary regulation is compulsory, at least for the larger systems, without 
compensation. If specific units are not able to provide the service, contracting the service 
from other units may be an interesting option helping overcome possible technical barriers. 
This was identified as a barrier within the RESPOND project for the opportunity for RES-
E/DG to sell this service to the TSO. However, it is unclear whether it should be 
recommended to change this practice. In the UK the requirement for providing primary 
reserves was expanded to all large generators – including wind parks – in order to apply 
equal rules for all generators.  
The secondary and tertiary reserves are much more interesting for market operation. The 
design of auctions for reserves is a key measure in the hands of the TSO. These auctions 
may be for long-term contracts with particular generators, e.g. designated peak load units, or 
annual, monthly or daily auctions for reserves. The revenues from these auctions may be 
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essential to support the capacity needed by the system. The fair design of these auctions is 
of particular interest for electricity regulators. 
Installation of designated conventional peak-load electricity-only boilers seems the least 
attractive option for increased flexibility. 
There is a range of possible future business opportunities for commercial aggregators, which 
may be offered by the market. Contingency units can be encouraged to take part in the 
market: However, there is no experience on their role in critical situations. Another 
opportunity is management of electric boilers, heat pump and heat storages for individual 
heating, currently supplied by natural gas or heating oil. Like district heating systems, 
individual heating with heat storages offer opportunities for the balancing and ancillary 
services market using electricity boilers – operating few hours per year – for down-regulation 
and heat pumps – with a high utilisation time – for up-regulation by reducing the electricity 
demand in critical hours. 
3.3 Recommendations for increasing capacity firmness 
and investment in conventional generation 
Short-term 
• Support schemes for maintaining existing conventional capacity should be considered 
together with schemes for support of RES-E. 
Short-term implementation – long-term impact 
• Criteria for licensing or tendering for new conventional capacity shall focus on 
locational issues.  
• In particular, the existence of urban district heating grids or the potentials for the 
development of large urban grids from existing heating systems should be accounted 
for. 
• Implementation of rules for competition among conventional and renewable 
technologies that address the targets of the European directives on CHP and 
renewables could also be considered. 
• Ancillary services markets should be created and they should be liquid enough. 
Revenues from well functioning AS markets should encourage existting conventional 
generation to keep in place operating and new conventional generation to be 
installed. 
Short and medium term implementation 
• Capacity payments outside the market for system firmness implicitly boost additional 
capacity should be considered carefully, taking into account that  such mechanisms 
increase average prices for generation capacity and thus give incentive to new 
investment 
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Table 3.1. Main recommendations for using conventional generation options 
Market 
Response Barrier 
Recommendations 
Short term Medium term Long term 
Incentive 
schemes 
Low market prices or 
complex criteria for 
regulation reserve 
participation from 
conventional 
generation (DE) 
Requirement in 
the grid codes for 
participation in 
load/frequency 
control 
  
Incentive 
schemes 
No remuneration for 
primary regulation 
service from 
conventional 
generation 
(mandatory) (ES, UK) 
  
Incentive 
schemes 
No capacity 
payments as 
potential means to 
overcome market 
failures for firm 
capacity 
provision/investment 
(2020 perspective), 
(DE, UK, DK) 
Support schemes 
for maintaining 
existing 
conventional 
capacity should be 
considered 
together with 
schemes for RES-
E. 
  
Incentive 
schemes 
Potentially wrong 
capacity investment 
incentives based on 
reserve margin (ES) 
   
Incentive 
schemes 
Market-oriented 
approach that could 
prevent outside-of-
market conventional 
capacity drivers (UK) 
   
Tendering Lack of response 
capacity 
Implementation of 
rules for 
competition 
among 
conventional and 
renewable 
technologies that 
address the 
targets of the 
European 
directives 
Licensing or tendering for new 
conventional capacity focusing on 
the existence of urban district 
heating grids. 
Regulation Lack of response 
capacity 
Interconnection of existing urban 
district heating grids to markets for 
large-scale CHP. 
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4 Demand response 
Other things being equal, increasing the share of intermittent production (mainly wind power) 
will increase the volatility of production, marginal cost of production, and prices. This is only 
occurring some times, while in most occasions prices generally will be rather low. Getting 
customers to perceive the varying prices in the market is one way to reduce the volatility and 
keep the system’s overall efficiency gains that may generally be obtained. However, for 
customers to react to market prices and their variations three conditions are to be met first: a) 
metering of consumption at relevant time-intervals, b) billing of consumption according to the 
marginal costs of production, and c) the ability of customers to change consumption in time 
to alleviate his higher cost of the consumer bill. Each of these three conditions poses a 
barrier to currently implementing these demand response by customers.  
4.1 Metering and communication technology 
Interval metering is a precondition for marked based demand response, and interval meters 
are being installed in all countries. However, the status on roll-out of meters is quite different 
in the case-study countries. In Spain a plan for a general roll-out is decided. In the 
Netherlands a general roll-out was planned, but is at present suspended. In Denmark and 
UK large customers have interval meters. A general roll-out for small customers has not 
been decided, but some companies have individual plans. In Germany customers may 
choose to install interval meters, but a general plan is not decided. Important conditions for 
an effective general roll-out of interval meters are a) the proper functionality of interval 
meters, b) communication standards, c) cost of meters and metering, and d) the ownership 
of meters and who profits from interval metering.  
Concerning the functionality of meters, the discussion is related to how customers should be 
engaged in demand response and at what time-interval. Most interval meters presently being 
installed have hourly/half hourly metering, and are simple interval meters that just measure 
consumption each hour/half hour. Very smart meters may measure consumption 
continuously, receive signals and control the consumption of individual appliances. If the 
purpose of demand response is to get customers to reach to day-ahead prices in power 
markets, hourly meters are sufficient. If customers are to be engaged in ancillary services, 
automatic response is required. This may go via the meter, a price-signal or just via the 
frequency in the network. That is, a first decision is which problem demand response should 
address. Looking at intermittent production and wind power, the main problem is at the hour 
to hour level and metering each hour/half hour seems adequate. Still, to ease customer 
engagement, the meter may be a smart meter. 
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The definition of communication standards is related to the choice of meters and the 
functionality of these. At present, common communication standards have not been defined. 
One first issue is to define the functionality of meters and the development of a common 
communication standard.  
Looking at the individual countries, interval meters presently introduced in Spain, Denmark 
and UK are mainly simple hourly/half hourly meters with automatic meter reading, but not 
equipped with automatic response options. In the Netherlands, the suspension of the general 
roll-out plan is due to a discussion of the functionality of the meters. In Germany installation 
of smart meters is liberalized and different meters may be chosen. 
Concerning the cost of meters and metering a general roll-out gives the lowest cost per 
meter. However, from an economic point of view there is a discussion of how fast and how 
far out new meters should be introduced. The main arguments for the new meters presently 
being installed are savings related to automatic metering, security of metering, and billing of 
customers. For small customers, demand response is mainly an argument for the future and 
the additional costs of a smart meter may be argued with preparing for future options. Again, 
defining the future functionality of meters is a critical barrier. 
A final barrier mentioned in the previous analyses is the ownership of meters. Typically 
DSOs install, pay and own meters, and have savings related to billing of customers. In a 
liberalised market, customers may change suppliers of electricity. The party in charge of 
metering should be distribution companies and not retailers. Thus, even if consumers change 
supplier, benefits from reduced metering cost will continue being received by the party that 
installed the meter and paid for it. Otherwise, counterincentives to the instllation of new meter 
would exist, as it has happened in the UK. If the retailing company installs and pays for the 
meter, legislation securing the installer of new meters an income or compensation when 
customers change supplier may be required. Alternatively, customers should pay for and 
own the meter. 
Concluding, plans for a general roll-out of new meters should be encouraged for UK, 
Germany and Denmark. However, before actual roll-out of meters, firstly the functionality of 
meters should be decided on and precise communication standards should be developed.   
4.2 Pricing rules 
Given interval metering and a liberalised market, from a theoretical point of view customers 
should be charged prices in the market. Again, depending on meters, prices could be hourly 
prices in the day a head market or real-time prices. Looking at intermittent production day-
ahead prices appear sufficient, but real-time prices and automatic control of specific 
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appliances/consumption is an option for increasing security of supply and getting customers 
to participate in the market for ancillary services. 
Looking at the present situation in the countries studied, for most customers wholesale prices 
are transferred to customers indirectly. Customers receive a fixed price covering all the price 
fluctuations, but do not see the hourly prices. In Denmark and UK large customers with 
hourly/half hourly metering may choose a tariff reflecting day-ahead prices. However, some 
reluctance to choose this rate is observed. In Spain Time-of-Use tariffs are used intensively 
and in the Netherlands a simple peak/off-peak tariff is available for the customers.  
Time-of-Use tariffs give an incentive to shift demand in time, but it does not reflect the 
stochastic nature of intermittent production and price variations caused by this. To reflect 
price-variations introduced by intermittent production market prices are required. Barriers 
mentioned for introducing/accepting wholesale prices are a) information costs and costs of 
changing consumption, b) wealth transfers between customers, and c) short-term gains seen 
in the market are small and long-term gains not very transparent for the customer.     
Information costs may be reduced by automatic control technologies but costs of changing 
consumption is difficult to change and will anyhow limit demand response.  
Wealth transfers between different customers is a barrier for getting some customers to 
choose hourly wholesale market prices. Customers that have a large consumption in 
expensive hour will receive a larger bill. However, this is exactly what is called for. Even if 
customers do not react to hourly prices, customers that receive a larger bill have an incentive 
to reduce consumption, especially is expensive hours. That is, from an economic point of 
view, customers should not have the opportunity to choose anything but wholesale prices. 
From a political point of view, price differentiation for all customers per hour seems difficult to 
be accepted. However, the price on other goods e.g. gasoline changes all the time too.   
The fact that short-term gains seen in the market are small and long-term gains not very 
transparent provides a low incentive to choose a “price per hour”. Besides, given an hourly 
price, the incentive for changing consumption is limited. Another reason for low short-term 
gains arethe limited variation in “hourly day a head prices” and partly by fixed additives to the 
wholesale price, e.g. fixed distribution charges and taxes per kWh. Increasing the share of 
intermittent production is expected to increase the price-variation. Fixed additives reduce the 
relative change in prices that customers pay, and this reduces incentives for changing 
consumption. Especially for Denmark the fixed tax-additive on household consumption is 
very large. Changing fixed additives to percent additives on the wholesale price is an option 
that increases incentives for changing consumption. The fraction of costs which does not 
depend on consumption should remain being charged as fixed prices. However, the fraction 
that is depending on the market outcome should depend on market prices. From a political 
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point of view, this may be opposed due to volatility of annual revenues (average electricity 
prices vary but average consumption is relatively stable over years) and due to income-
distribution policies. If electricity is evaluated a necessity good large taxes in years with high 
average prices may not be acceptable.  
Concluding on prices, given interval meters, customers should be charged wholesale market 
prices and should not be given the opportunity to choose otherwise. For the integration of 
intermittent production day-ahead market prices appear sufficient, giving customers a 
reasonable time to react. Standards for informing customers about prices should be 
developed. To increase security of supply real-time pricing and automatic response by 
specific customers is an option for the long-term. Concerning price-additives, e.g. taxes 
these should be a type of percentage on the wholesale price. . 
4.3 Enabling technologies 
Today, only a limited number of enabling technologies that enable effectively demand 
response can – given the right incentives – be developed and used in the short run. Part of 
the consumption may be moved in time without very large costs, other parts are very costly 
to move. The share of movably consumption is difficult to assess, but in general consumption 
related to heating, cooling, and pumping may be moved a couple of hours without severe 
costs. In addition, storage technologies may be introduced and developed further.  
Development of storage and enabling technologies is not necessarily driven by demand 
flexibility. In many cases, energy savings and comfort is the key issue but the same 
technologies will increase demand flexibility. Incentives for applying and encouraging the 
development of these technologies may be given nationally or at EU-level.  
A first pre-requisite for developing and applying enabling technologies is that basic 
infrastructure and incentives are in place. That is, customers should be charged varying 
prices and information on price-variations should be easily obtainable. Next, new 
technologies have to prove their profitability for the customer and that they actually work. To 
achieve this, demonstration projects are needed. Finally, for some technologies, subsidy 
schemes, other economic incentives, or legislation may be needed. For, example, appliances 
may be equipped with control units cutting of the appliance if prices become very high or the 
frequency in the network drops. To implement this, standards, norms, and/or legislation that 
all new appliances should be equipped with a control unit may be needed. If a refrigerator is 
equipped with a frequency controlled cut-off both the negative benefit and the savings of a 
short cut-off is very limited for the customer, and therefore the incentive to choose a 
refrigerator with a control unit very limited. However, for the system, benefits are quite high. 
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To achieve this benefit, either customers have to receive a payment for accepting the control 
unit or legislation requiring all new refrigerators to have the control unit should be enforced. 
To increase the share of movable electricity consumption, electric heating and storage of 
heat is a relatively cheap option and should be considered in every system. In the Spanish 
and German systems, the use of storage systems at household level is very limited and in 
UK district heating has a very low popularity.  
In the medium and longer term another technology that may increase the share of electricity 
consumption that may be flexible in time is electric vehicles. In relation to this, it is important 
to decide whether charging of batteries may be controlled by prices or centrally by DSOs. In 
addition, when batteries are worn out for use in the vehicle, they may be used as stationary 
storage capacity and may be charged and de-charged according to system requirements.      
4.4 Recommendations 
All relevant initiatives to increase demand flexibility in the short-, medium-, and long-term are 
summarized in Table 4.1.  
Currently, the potentials of smart metering are barely tested systematically. Therefore 
concrete implementation recommendations need accurately function and potential analysis 
and implementation of demonstration projects. RESPOND should suggest the expansion of 
field trials. 
When this is done, a scheme for a general roll-out of meters should be developed. An option 
is to introduce simple meters, but to prepare these for upgrades to intelligent meters that may 
receive signals and control the consumption of specific appliances. For intelligent meters, an 
option to be considered is centrally controlled updates of the software that controls the 
functioning of the meter.     
Concerning prices, customers should be charged the marginal cost of production and 
delivery of electricity to individual customers. Given hourly metering, day-ahead prices in the 
market appear reasonable, since they give the customer time to plan consumption. If 
intelligent meters and price controlled cut-off units are installed, real time pricing and 
automatic response is an option. If congestions in the network implies local differences in 
delivery costs and these differences are calculated prices should reflect these differences. 
That is, in the short-term where simple hourly meters are installed, sending customers day-
ahead prices in the market is appropriate. In the medium- to long-term, where intelligent 
meters are installed, at least for some customers, real-time and local prices should be aimed 
for. 
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Finally, on prices, fixed price-additives should be reduced and as wide as possible changed 
to percent additives on the hourly prices. The fraction of costs which does not depend on 
consumption should remain being charged as fixed prices. However, the fraction that is 
depending on the market outcome should depend on market prices. However, this will 
increase the volatility of annual revenues and bills to be paid by customers. 
Enabling technologies that increase demand flexibility fall into two categories: Control 
technologies and technologies that increase the share of flexible demand. Concerning 
control technologies, in the medium term technologies and communication standards should 
be developed. In the short term, demonstration projects showing benefits and needed 
improvements should be carried out. Concerning additional flexible demand, in the short term 
heating and storage of heat is a relatively cheap option. In the medium- and long-term, other 
storage facilities and electrical vehicles are promising technologies. Especially concerning 
electric vehicles, controllability of charging and possibly de-charging of batteries is an issue. 
Table 4.1. Main measures for increasing demand flexibility 
short-term medium-term long-term 
Functionality/Standardis
ation
Define a common 
standard for meters. 
New meters should be 
prepared for being smart
Roll-out of new meters
A general roll-out should 
be encouraged. To 
reduce costs of changing 
meters all customers in 
specific areas should 
change meters at the 
same time 
All customers 
should have 
new meters
Ownership of meters
Owners of meters should 
benefit form savings on 
metering or be 
compensated if savings 
are gained by others
Hourly prices
With hourly metering 
default pricing should be 
hourly prices
Price-additives
Price additives should be 
changed, to the extent 
possible, from fixed - to 
% additives
Control technologies:
Price signals
Frequency signals
Centrally determined 
consumption
New consuming 
technologies:
Electrical vehicles
Heating
Storage
RecommendationsMarket Response Pre-condition
Where economic increase the share of 
electricity based heating and storage of 
heat
Implementation of 
enabling technologies
Develop storage facilities
Pricing
Metering
Control technologies should be 
developed and implemented by 
customers and suppliers     
Introduction of electric vehicles and securing that batteries 
are charged according to system needs
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5 National energy and ancillary services 
markets 
5.1 Issues on electricity markets 
The key instrument for integration of RES-E and micro-scale CHP are the electricity spot 
markets, which have been developed in several countries or regional groups of countries 
over the last two decades. These markets were not developed to support RES-E and CHP, 
but as an instrument to introduce competition into the electricity supply industry, which 
should lead to less institutional and technological conservatism. 
5.1.1 Key elements of spot markets 
Before the introduction of electricity spot markets, a small number of large generating units 
were scheduled by economic dispatch on the basis of short-term marginal costs of the 
available generating units in “merit order”, following the diurnal and seasonal variations in 
electricity demand, and taking into account network physical and security constraints. Load 
following and ancillary services were provided by hydro capacity or thermal units suitable for 
load variations on short notice including units running as spinning reserves. This task is 
dependent on short-term uncertainties in demand and events such as unscheduled outages 
of large units, rather than the level of the demand.  
The introduction of spot markets has changed the method for economic dispatch, but hardly 
made any change to the overall way of approaching the load following (demand-generation 
balance) issue. In order to describe the new situation, next paragraphs provide the key 
elements in a day-ahead spot market using the terminology of the Power Pool of England 
and Wales after the privatisation of the electricity supply industry from 1990. All major 
generating units in England and Wales were required to participate in the market and bids on 
prices and volumes were linked to locations, which allowed the system operator to maintain 
the geographical balance between supply and demand. 
The demand curve for each hour (or half-hour in the UK) within the next 12-36 hours is 
typically inelastic and is based on forecasts made by the system operator. The supply curve 
is made up of bids from the generators, each consisting of a price and a volume. After sorting 
the bids, the system marginal price represents the lowest price and the accumulated volume 
that will meet the demand. A pool purchase price, which consists of the system marginal 
price plus some capacity payment or loss-of-load-probability, (LOLP) payment, will then 
apply to all successful generators.  
However, this procedure does not consider network constraints. Thus, the system operator 
needs to ‘constrain out’ generators in surplus areas with bids lower than the previously 
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computed system marginal costs, and vice versa in areas with a deficit, where constrained 
on units will be scheduled despite having sent bids higher than the system marginal cost 
previously computed . In these cases the system operator shall compensate the difference 
between the bid price and system price and the costs of this arrangement will be added as 
uplift to the pool purchase price as a pool selling price. 
An alternative to the design in England and Wales, and also in other countries, is that in the 
Nordic market. In contrast to the market in England and Wales, participation in the Nordic 
market, which started in the mid-1990s, was voluntary and bidders were legal entities each 
controlling a portfolio of different generating technologies. The Nordic market has now 
become the model for all electricity spot markets in Europe, both on the continent and in the 
UK. In addition to the day-ahead market, the power exchanges usually operate a forward 
market for contracts covering days, weeks, seasons or years, and intraday markets with gate 
closure time shortly before real time. 
The geographical balance within the day-ahead market is established in the Nord Pool 
exchange either by geographical market splitting into areas with different prices, or counter 
trade by which the system operator within a price area buys up-regulation from generators in 
areas with deficit and down-regulation in surplus areas, with payments similar to the uplift 
mechanism as described above. Market splitting is used to manage transmission bottlenecks 
between the countries, while both methods can be used by the system operator within each 
country. The general recommendation by Nord Pool is that temporally imbalances should be 
met by counter trade, while permanent ones should be met by price areas. So far this 
recommendation has been practised in Norway only. By geography, Denmark is divided into 
two systems, East and West. However, market splitting into two price areas is now also 
considered within Western Denmark, when more wind capacity and further international 
connection will be installed in the coming years. 
Differences between the demand and the contracted volumes in the day-ahead market are 
traded in an intra-day market with gate closure shortly before real time. This will reduce the 
differences between traded volumes and actual demands and deliveries. Also markets for 
ancillary services are being considered as a mechanism for providing generating capacity 
when and where it is needed.  
Finally, differences between contracted and delivered volumes are settled by a mechanism 
that penalises deviations from contracted volumes. 
This system was originally devised to manage predictable variations in demand as well as 
uncertainties concerning the real-time demands and unscheduled outages of generating 
units. Large volumes of intermittent generation will be additional sources of variations and 
uncertainty to be handled by the system. 
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The balancing and ancillary services mechanisms in the Nord Pool are based on contracts 
between the system operator and the owners of the generating capacity providing the 
services. These contracts are based on tender and auctions for capacities available for a 
longer or shorter period. With an increasing share of intermittent capacity and accumulated 
experience of the market participants, the length of the contracts becomes shorter. The most 
recent development has been the introduction of daily auctions for (up-regulation and down-
regulation) reserve capacity in Denmark from April 2007 – in addition to the previous annual 
and monthly auctions. These auctions will gradually replace long-term contracts for reserves. 
Different types of compensation are used for regulating power market. In Denmark, market 
suppliers get the price of their bid to the regulation market, In Norway, Sweden and Finland, 
where wind power is insignificant, all suppliers on the regulating market receive the marginal 
price for power regulation at the specific hour 
The increase in wind power has made down-regulation quite important and profitable. This 
has lead to the introduction of negative prices on the day-ahead market – from September 
2008 at the EEX in Germany and from October 2009 at Nord Pool. 
During the last two decades there has been a dynamic development of the electricity markets 
in Europe. These markets have been able to accommodate the various new technologies. 
Further developments are being planned, often to facilitate the integration of distributed 
technologies and improve competition. Also the international integration of the markets is 
under development. However, in the short and medium term, European harmonisation of 
rules may be premature or even counterproductive. So far, the practical experience of the 
market participants is limited, and methods to analyse market results are yet to be 
developed. 
The remainder of this section discusses other main aspects for the participation of DG/RES 
in energy and AS markets and measures that should be implemented to satisfactorily deal 
with them.  
5.1.2 Market access, size limitations and aggregation of units 
Existing barriers seem not to prevent the connection of RES/CHP and its participation in the 
energy market. However, there are some key aspects whose treatment could be modified. In 
particular, high trading fees might, in practice, represent an obstacle to market access. This 
is the case of the Netherlands and Denmark. Aggregation of units is an effective solution to 
overcome size limitation for entering the market and is already taking place in several 
countries. The aggregation of units can also reduce transaction costs. However, it is not 
possible for micro-CHP and heat pumps to integrate in commercial aggregators in most of 
the considered countries. In addition, the possibility of being curtailed by the TSO for network 
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security reasons can also prevent the participation of RES in markets. This may be the case 
in Spain and the UK. However, curtailing RES in Spain is only considered an option when the 
remaining resources have been depleted and it is required to guarantee the security of the 
system. Also related to this, the curtailment of DG/RES to provide negative reserve is 
regarded as an option in Germany and Denmark. 
Regarding access to ancillary or system services (AS) markets, the main issue refers to the 
controllability of RES/CHP. Assuming that, from a technical point of view, some RES 
generators (wind) will be controllable in the near future, their participation in AS requires that 
system operation practices are replaced by more modern (active) ones, as well as the 
implementation of an adequate remuneration scheme that effectively encourage RES to 
participate in these markets. In this regard, participation in AS market by RES/DG will only be 
profitable for them if RES/DG support payments are commensurate with the benefits that the 
RES/DG energy sold by these generators produces for the system. Thus, support payment 
systems where premiums over the market price exist, or even systems that establish a global 
quota for RES/DG (thus enabling competition among technologies) are preferable in this 
regard to Feed-in Tariffs.   
Another option to be considered is whether rules for bidding in the market should be changed 
thus and the effect that changes in these rules could have both for intermittent and not 
intermittent generators. For example, is it possible that bids beyond the bidding period should 
be allowed for certain generators or is the bidding periods of e.g. 6 hours enough? The 
argument for the block bids is that the bidding price can be reduced if the start and stop costs 
can be divided on several hours with certainty instead of with just some probability. The next 
paragraph explains how block bids have been designed in the Nord Pool intraday market.  
“Block bidding in the Elbas trading system. A block bid is an aggregated bid for several consecutive 
hours with a fixed bidding price and volume. A block bid must be accepted in its entirety; if accepted 
the contract covers all hours and the volume specified in the bid. A block bid can consist of all hours 
open for trading; hence a block bid can at the maximum be up to 32 hours long. The minimum length 
of a block bid is one hour. A block bid made for one hour differs from the ordinary hourly bid in the 
sense that the block bid is “all or none”, whereas ordinary hourly bids also can be accepted partly”.1 . 
5.1.3 Responsibility for production deviations, prediction of production and 
gate closures closer to real-time 
In most countries (Spain, UK, Denmark and Netherlands) RES is responsible for deviations, 
i.e. they must pay penalizations for the production deviations incurred, which in fact 
constitutes an incentive to develop better prediction tools. Only in Germany RES producers 
are not held responsible for deviations. This may turn out to become an important barrier for 
 
1 Nord Pool:, Block bids manual.pdf, www.nordpool.com. 
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a much larger variable RES deployment, because then deviations caused by RES output 
prediction errors are larger and the TSO must provide larger reserves to offset these 
deviations. ..  
Country analysis indicates that gate closure times within energy markets range from a 
maximum of 8 hours ahead of real time (last intraday market for each day closes at 17:45 in 
Spain) to 1 hour ahead of real time (UK, Denmark, Netherlands). The division of 
responsibilities between the TSO and the market operator in Spain, which does not allow 
merging markets, has been reported as the major barrier to further reducing gate closure 
times in this country. Even though implementing intraday markets result in gate closure times 
that are closer to real time, the liquidity of these markets is considered a problem in Germany 
and Denmark and employing a balancing market is preferred. 
5.2 TSO balancing 
This section proposes different regulatory initiatives in order to encourage an increasing 
entrance of renewable energy resources in the European electricity systems by means of an 
increase of the system’s capability required to cope with the variation in the output of 
intermittent generation. This fact should respect TSO’s perspective: to maximize renewable 
installed capacity and production in the system, but always warranting system security. 
A safety operation of the system requires continuous adaptation of generation units output to 
cover demand evolution. In order to guarantee the fulfilment of this task at operational level, 
detailed long term planning and programming tasks are required to warrant system 
adequacy. The system operator will manage all available resources in real time operation, 
where generation and demand have to be fitted.   
Increasing levels of not controllable generation (wind power, overall) produces higher 
balancing costs and it is necessary to encourage a higher participation in ancillary services 
provision, from both conventional and RES-P/CHP generation. Thus, entrance of flexible 
generation to the system should be encouraged. More often, TSO has to order conventional 
generation re-schedules and even start-up’s and shut-down’s actions. In this way, an 
adequate balancing pricing mechanism would yield several advantages.  
Beside this, balancing costs will decrease if deviation from schedules will do so. Thus, it is 
very important in order to maximize renewable penetration in the system to improve forecast 
tools regarding both renewable injections (wind, solar, etc.) and demand evolution. 
Moreover, management of renewable units from control dispatches (with tele-measurements 
and tele-commands), and encouragement of their participation at intraday and balancing 
markets will improve the penetration capability of these units in the system. 
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Further system improvement can be provided by more flexible balancing tools or models that 
can guarantee the necessary reliability for electric systems if more and more intermittent 
generation penetrates.  
Finally, adequate demand management schemes will provide further flexibility in order to 
maximize renewable entrance to the system. 
Next, the main regulatory initiatives that should be implemented at European level, from the 
point of view of the management of system and ancillary services, are described.  
5.2.1 Encouraging an increase in the flexibility of generation in the system 
Higher levels of flexibility are required to integrate larger amounts of intermittent generation 
in power systems. The variable and unpredicted changes in the output of RES/DG power 
plants could be covered by conventional generators. Therefore encouraging entrance of 
necessary flexible conventional generation capacity is required. Some different market and 
regulatory mechanisms and incentives are analysed below to increase flexible part of the 
overall power generation in the system. 
Economic incentives to increase the amount of flexible generation capacity available 
in the system 
Provision of regulation reserve from conventional generators is a key instrument to allow 
increasing penetration of renewable intermittent generation with variability and 
unpredictability characteristics. Consequently economic incentives should be in place to 
secure a sufficient amount of conventional flexible generation capacity being available to 
cope with load and renewable supply variability. 
Investment in conventional generation may become less attractive due to the integration of 
large shares of RES generation, as their energy sales and marginal energy prices could 
decrease, and wear could increase (due to more often start-up’s and shut down’s). Thus, 
additional economic incentives to install new generation capacity should be envisaged, 
besides energy incomes. If these investment payments were not implemented, systems 
might be prone to experience reserve margin shortages. This could have serious effects over 
system adequacy (long term) and security (short term) and, beside this, higher price volatility 
might take place. Thus, through this service there must be created enough long-term 
economic incentives to encourage flexible generation to connect to the system. 
Regarding an EU comparison, while in the Spanish system there is nowadays such a long 
term incentive mechanism to install new conventional generation, in Denmark, Germany, and 
United Kingdom there is not currently such an explicit incentive mechanism. 
Another mechanism to provide firmness in critical periods when demand is not supplied by 
intermittent generators output is capacity agreements between TSOs and conventional 
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generation units for less than a year. Thus, an availability payment mechanism might be put 
in place, whereby the system operator is allowed to arrange availability bilateral contracts 
with flexible generation, as for example: 
o Peaking capacity units such as gas turbines. 
o Pump storage units: capability at the upper reservoir to be used in case of excess of 
renewable production in the system. 
The generators commit themselves to be available when needed by the system, in return for 
earning the availability payments established in the contract. Through these contracts, there 
must be created enough economic incentive to encourage flexible generation availability 
when the system needs it. 
This implies that besides energy markets, it is necessary to create parallel capacity markets 
with flexible generation in the system different time horizons (e.g. less and above a year). 
Next, different mechanisms in place at different EU countries to encourage conventional 
generators to produce energy whenever the system needs them to cover demand are 
described. 
For instance, in the Netherlands the system operator contracts a certain amount of regulating 
reserve power and emergency power. These reserves are contracted outside the market, to 
prevent the possibility that contracted power is not available for securing supply during peak 
demand periods. In the case of the Spanish system, an availability service will be established 
in brief whereby the system operator will be allowed to enter into bilateral contracts with 
certain units. Service will be provided throughout 1year contracts. Finally, there is not a 
capacity service as such in Denmark, Germany and United Kingdom. 
Minimum outputs below steady-state minimum output 
High wind production (especially during valley hours) makes the system needs more 
flexibility from generators. This excess of wind might force TSOs to decrease conventional 
generation production in order to avoid spilling primary renewable resources. Indeed, 
sometimes conventional thermal units must be disconnected from the system in order to 
maintain a balance between generation and demand. 
This fact might reduce power plants life span. Besides this, their operation’s costs and wear 
increase. Thus, system security might be jeopardized, not only due to the mentioned 
conventional units wear, but also due to the fact that the fact that large amount of renewable 
is in place might cause a sudden trip of a great amount of renewable units in the system, if a 
fault occurs (nowadays a great percentage of old-technology renewable units connected to 
the system are not able to withstand voltage dips caused by faults in the system). 
 46
At TSO level, measures to enable more flexible conventional thermal units operation should 
be implemented, such as encouraging transient operation at lower minimum output levels 
during short periods of time. This fact should allow the system to better withstand high wind 
production during valley hours, avoiding disconnecting conventional thermal units from the 
system and increasing system security and adequacy since failure risk of these units needed 
to cover the demand at peak hours, is reduced, as well as, more reserve and balancing 
energy is available for the system’s operation. 
Summary of main recommendations   
In order to establish via regulation in the system sufficient and effective economic incentives 
to promote the entrance of new flexible generation in the system and to obtain higher 
flexibility levels from already connected generation units both capacity and availability 
payments for generation could be implemented. Besides, units should increase their 
regulating capability (for example, reducing their minimum output level). 
5.2.2 Demand response flexibility 
Increasing flexibility of existing and new conventional generation units might not be enough 
to cope with large renewable intermittent generation increasing entrance in power systems.  
Increasing demand response and flexibility may become a complementary and efficient way 
to allow a higher fluctuating/intermittent renewable production level in the system. The main 
advantages in this regard are the following: 
• Demand response may counteract higher prices volatility caused by an increasing 
renewable supply level in the system, which brings benefits from the point of view of 
generation adequacy (lower financial risks due to price volatility). 
• Demand response can provide more secure system operation at short term, and 
higher system adequacy in the long term. 
Some different proposals are analysed in the following paragraphs in order to increase 
demand response flexibility. 
Access to ancillary service markets for demand side providers 
It should be encouraged a more active role of demand regarding ancillary services provision 
in several time horizons (annual, monthly, weekly and real time), throughout contracts 
between TSOs and providers. 
Thus, demand side providers could commit themselves to reduce consumption when 
generation is scarce in the system and to increase it when a generation surplus occurs, in 
return for earning the payments established in the contract. 
Next, different experiences in place in different EU countries that allow demand side to 
provide ancillary services are described. For instance, large consumers in The Netherlands 
 47
connected to the high voltage grid have to inform the TSO of their capacity to reduce their 
consumption. Consumers connected to the high voltage network with contracted power equal 
to or above 60 MW are compelled to be involved in the balancing market. 
In the case of the UK system, consumers are allowed to participate in the provision of 
frequency maintenance functions. They usually get involved in this through a commercial 
aggregation company. In the case of the Spanish tertiary reserve market, only pumping units 
are allowed to participate nowadays, as demand side providers. In the case of Germany, 
consumers are considered as reserve providers. 
Demand response can increase by means of interruptibility contracts. Currently, large 
consumers connected to the transmission system can get this kind of agreement with 
Spanish and British TSO. Providers of this service get a discount in their electricity bills, in 
the Spanish case, and a call out fee if the load is interrupted in the British system. In 
Germany, only very few large consumers have interruptible contracts. 
Encouraging storage devices in the system 
As explained in the section of this document fro demand, electricity and heat storage devices 
are key technologies to enable TSOs to manage power system in a more efficient manner 
from both security and economy points of view. 
An electric car is a kind of electricity storage. Electric cars connected to the network could 
bring higher flexibility levels in the system, acting as a storage mechanism in case of energy 
surplus in the system, and injecting energy when energy shortages occur. Different policies 
about the installation of electricity and heat storage devices have been developed in the EU 
countries.  
In the case of the German system, electricity storage is mainly envisaged in the form of 
pumped hydro storage, batteries for mobility and fuel cells. Also the possibility of adiabatic 
compressed air storage is investigated. In The Netherlands, there are heating storage 
facilities linked to agriculture processes. In Spain, there is no specific plan to increase this 
kind of devices in the system, but it is under research the future integration of the electric car 
as an electricity storage device. In Denmark, the power company DONG has launched a 
project to build up an infrastructure for charging and shifting batteries for electric cars. 
Control of customer equipment 
Also commented in the section about demand, it is advisable that an increasing number of 
consumers become sensible to economic signals. Local equipments could control the level of 
demand based on energy prices. For this purpose, demand should receive continuous 
information about energy market prices in order to be able to adapt their consumption. This 
higher economic efficiency renders security improvements as well. 
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As the time reaction gets very short, automatic control response devices become more 
effective than incentives based on market price. Thus, control local equipments could be 
installed at certain consumers in order to let them to react to frequency/voltage drops in the 
system.  
Beside this, additional control schemes can be developed to allow TSOs to order real-time 
customers load reduction/increase instructions, when system requires it. Next, different 
mechanisms in place in different EU countries to encourage the installation of smart meters 
in the system are described: 
In the Spanish system every measurement’s equipment for consumers below 15 kW of rated 
contracted peak demand must be substituted by smart meters before the end of 2018. In The 
Netherlands, connections equal or above 0.1 MW are obliged to install smart meters. 
Concerning small customers, only newly constructed houses are forced to install this kind of 
devices by law. In the UK there are plans for developing pilot projects to install smart meters. 
Summary of main recommendations 
Promoting a more active role of demand side in balancing services in the system. is 
paramount to its efficient functioning. In order to achieve this, demand should be allowed to 
access both energy and AS markets. More storage capacity should be installed on the 
demand side and the level of controllability of customer equipment should significantly 
increase.. 
5.2.3 Improvement and harmonization of balancing mechanisms at European 
level  
National balancing mechanisms alone might not be a sufficient tool for a national TSO to 
manage the loads to guarantee reliability of supply at high variable RES/DG penetration 
shares. And additional instrument could be the coordination of balancing schemes between 
neighbouring TSOs in order to cope with this higher supply variability. 
First ideas to encourage regional energy and balancing European markets 
The following first set of ideas should be taken into account: 
• To implement coordinated explicit interconnections capacity auctions and, 
complementary, implicit mechanisms (market splitting/ market coupling). 
Interconnection capacity should be filled sequentially through consecutive capacity 
auctions (yearly, monthly, etc., until day-ahead). Remaining Net Transfer Capacity 
(NTC) should be let, firstly, for intraday trading purposes and, secondly, for balancing 
purposes (EURELECTRIC, 2008)  
• To harmonize at European level day-ahead market and intraday gate closure times. 
• To coordinate intraday markets´ gate closure times with the creation of a continuous 
balancing mechanism (EURELECTRIC, 2008)  
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• Put intraday gate closures nearer to real time might decrease deviation costs of RES 
units as forecast would be more accurate. Nevertheless, it should be taken into 
account the security analysis time constraint (difficult to reduce from a realistic point 
of view).  
• An adequate Ancillary services definition harmonization throughout Europe is 
envisaged as very advisable: definition of each service, time scales… 
• Pricing mechanisms harmonization throughout Europe: for instance, in some systems 
Ancillary Services (AS) costs are recovered through end-consumer energy payments, 
while in other cases these are recovered through access tariffs (also known as use of 
system charges). Beside this, there are countries where access tariffs apply only to 
consumers, while in other countries access tariffs apply both to generators and loads. 
Capacity payments are another important factor to be harmonized throughout Europe.  
• Furthermore, AS pricing mechanisms should be harmonized as well. For instance 
primary reserve is remunerated or not depending on the specific European system. 
Other example: there are systems where tertiary reserve receives double 
remuneration (capacity and usage), while in other systems only energy usage 
payment is applied for tertiary reserve providers. 
• Negative prices on the day-ahead market can be a useful tool to encourage 
generators – including wind turbines to produce less electricity in few hours, when 
wind power is expected to exceed the demand and the capability of thermal 
generators to reduce their production economically. This was introduced on the 
German EEX market in 2008. From October 2009 a negative price floor at -200 
€/MWh will be introduced by Nord Pool for Denmark. 
Cross-border trading reserves 
Implementing reserve trading mechanisms throughout interconnections have the additional 
benefit to increase the competition level at AS provision. Beside this, adequate reserve 
coordination between systems can produce benefits if one system is “long” and the adjacent 
system is “short”, regarding upward/downward reserve. Thus, it might be possible to reduce 
each TSO reserve requirement through a reserve sharing mechanism. This mechanism can 
be implemented either at TSO-TSO level, or at TSO – foreign provider level. The TSO-TSO 
approach is envisaged as the preferred solution (ERGEC, 2009)  
The allocation of offers for balancing services to the neighbouring control areas should be 
possible only when it does not endanger the security of the local area. The development of a 
commercial arrangement to facilitate cross border service provision should, in no way, affect 
the ability of System Operators to perform inter-TSO Emergency arrangements.   
One solution to this issue is the establishment of a balancing mechanism cross-border 
model, which has been implemented with success in some European countries, as in cross-
border reserves market developed in the Nordel area.  
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Applying a cross-border balancing mechanism would produce a wider diversity of balancing 
reserves, and higher levels of efficiency and competitiveness (allowing foreign market 
players to participate in other countries’ balancing markets) and, thus, a decrease of the total 
balancing costs. On the long run, full harmonisation of neighbour balancing markets could 
increase these beneficial effects. Main barrier to cross-border reserves trading is due to the 
lack of harmonization between the different national balancing markets services and 
procedures. Cross-border balancing trades may have to cope nowadays with a lack of 
harmonization in the following aspects: 
• Differences regarding economic issues, as pricing methods or application or not of 
deviation penalties between balancing energy markets in different countries.  
• Differences regarding technical prerequisites for the suppliers to provide balancing 
services (activation time, time to full activation). 
• Gate closure times (different gate closures will lead to asymmetric market 
opportunities and different imbalance exposures at both sides of the border). 
• Time interval for the submission of real-time energy bids in the real-time market. 
• Pricing mechanism: marginal pricing versus pay as bid. 
Creation of Balancing Responsible Parties and/or RES production aggregators 
The creation of the so-called Balancing Responsible Parties (BRPs) seem a key issue for 
renewable integration in the system promoting a more active role from Balancing 
Responsible Parties closer to real time.  Through these Balancing Responsible Parties, it 
would be allowed to aggregate generation (establishing the so called virtual power plants) 
and demand, in order to compensate for deviations. The Balancing Responsible Parties 
responsible would be in charge of keeping the balance by re-scheduling their generators 
output and demand entities consumption either at internal level of the Balancing Responsible 
Parties, or by participating in intraday processes or, closer to real-time, by participating in the 
continuous balancing market established.  
Regarding RES production aggregators, in Germany, Netherlands, Spain and the United 
Kingdom, there is the possibility of aggregating RES production. Finally, it is important that 
the transition from aggregator’s schedule level to physical unit’s program level should respect 
security constraints in the system. For instance, in the Spanish case, the allocation of energy 
schedule’s  at physical units level is required to comply with the security studies carried out 
by the system operator.  
RES-E balancing responsibility for deviations  
It is quite important to establish adequate deviation pricing mechanisms in order to reach a 
good trade-off between: 
• Adequate penalty to discourage deviations from schedule. It would promote better 
forecasting tools (wind, solar). 
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• Despite deviations penalties, there should remain an adequate incentive to participate 
in energy markets, by merging small production renewable units in Balancing 
Responsible Parties in order to compensate deviations. 
Deviation pricing mechanisms should be harmonized at European level as well. 
For instance, in the United Kingdom there are penalties associated with variations from 
contracted output in the wholesale markets – but these apply to all market participants. RES 
and DG would feel the impact of these penalties more severely because they are often 
intermittent in nature and thus more likely to deviate from their contracted position. Typically, 
intermittent RES and DG would contract with an energy supplier (as described earlier) to 
mitigate this risk. Regarding the German case, RES are currently not responsible for 
deviations, and this responsibility is assumed by the different German TSO´s. In Netherlands 
and in Spain, RES units are responsible for their imbalance like all other generators.  
Finally, in Denmark, Netherlands, Spain and UK RES subsidies are attractive enough to 
compensate for RES deviation costs.  
Summary of main recommendations 
Harmonizing balancing services throughout Europe, and promoting balancing coordinated 
actions among TSOs is central to the integration of RES/DG. 
5.2.4 Harmonizing at European level regulatory/technical requirements for 
renewable generation and promoting their future active role in AS 
provision 
Nowadays, some European TSOs are rather reluctant towards high level of renewable 
generation units connecting to the system. Among other reasons, this is due to the lack of 
standardized technical requirements that would have to be imposed to all renewable units 
connected to the system, which are necessary to warrant system security. Beside these 
technical requirements, it should be promoted a future more active role of renewable units in 
AS provision, in order to avoid that all AS provision responsibility, on the generation side, 
remains in the hands of conventional generation. 
Establishment of a set of harmonized requirements for RES-E units to AS  
The following harmonized requirements should be implemented to allow RES to contribute to 
AS in all European countries: 
• Increase the level of observability (tele-measurements). Every RES unit above a 
given size (in Spain ≥ 10 MW) must be observable (tele-measurements sent every 4 
sec) from a control centre (24 hours duty).  
• Withstand without disconnection pre-specified voltage and frequency dips. 
• Contribute to voltage control tasks at Transmission level. 
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• Contribute to primary reserve obligations or to transfer its obligation (through a 
contract) to a third party. 
• Be willing to obey real time instructions from TSO; for instance, real time generation 
reductions for security reasons. 
• Requirements for RES to become AS providers:  
• Minimum RES size (10 MW in the Spanish system) 
• Capability to keep a given schedule 
• Specific capabilities for each type of ancillary services such as to follow upward and 
downward generation ramps. 
• RES units should participate in energy markets in order to make them responsible for 
their expected unbalances (if RES units remain under an integral tariff, this unbalance 
responsibility is assumed by TSOs). 
Although these requirements might be seen as RES penetration barriers in the short term, 
they may maximize in the mid and long term the system capability to increase the amount of 
capacity installed of this type. 
Next, certain technical requirements for RES units in Denmark, Germany, The Netherlands 
and Spain respective Grid Codes are described. In Denmark, the grid codes contain detailed 
requirements for fault ride through capability and voltage dips (in some GridCodes called 
voltage drops). These are different for wind turbines connected to different voltage levels 
below and above 100 kV. For small thermal units the requirements vary with the capacity. 
These limits are 11 kW and 1.5 MW. In Germany, main requirements are: reactive power 
provision and fault ride through capability. In the Netherlands, the power factor of units must 
be within limits (e.g. for generators in low-voltage networks, the power factor must be 
between 0.9 lagging and 0.9 leading).Besides, the electrical installation must be equipped 
with under-voltage and overvoltage protection. 
In Spain, wind farms are mandated to be able to ride voltage dips of certain characteristics 
defined by the operational procedures of the SO. The threshold values for voltage dip 
duration and amount that wind generators have to ride are specified in the Grid Code, so no 
generator could disconnect from the network within a certain range during a short circuit (See 
D6, section 2.1.3). Wind generators also have to contribute to primary frequency control. 
They must have the ability to reduce power output if frequency is too high and raise it if 
frequency is too low. Additionally, every unit or aggregation of units larger than 10MW must 
be connected to a control centre. Finally, controllability of generation is required to access 
the AS markets in Spain. 
Next, the curtailment capability of RES production by different TSOs is described: 
• In Denmark there are annual, monthly and (since April 2007) daily auctions for 
reserve capacity). When activated, these reserves are paid at a market price for up-
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regulation or down-regulation. Market access by decentralized CHP generators was 
prepared in co-operation with several production BRPs and the TSO. Units above 5 
MW must take part in the market. Down-regulation capacities include modern wind 
turbine and electric boilers for district heating systems.  
• In Germany, the grid operator only gives an online signal to RES plant operator to 
shut down. They do not control the plants directly. A compensation for this curtailment 
is considered in the new RES remuneration framework. 
• In the Netherlands, the TSO can instruct generators to increase/reduce their output or 
turn on/off their units in case of emergency and if previously taken measures did not 
have the desired result. This applies to all generation units with an installed capacity 
of more than 5 MW and with available capacity at their disposal. No compensation 
seems to be provided to any generator. 
• In Spain, every unit above 10MW must be connected with a generation control centre. 
The network operator has no control over the remaining smaller groups. At the TSO 
control centre for RES units (CECRE), the maximum wind energy output that the 
system can allow under specific safety conditions is calculated in real time. If the 
actual production is higher than this value any unit connected to it can be curtailed. 
The TSO can also curtail the production of any RES-E to solve grid congestions as a 
last resource. Wind generators, as any conventional generator, are given 15% of the 
spot price in case of real time curtailment. 
• In the United Kingdom, small scale generators are treated as negative loads and not 
centrally dispatched. Generators above 100 MW are registered as Balancing 
Mechanism Units. TSOs can modify their dispatch by buying the bids and offers they 
submitted to the BM market in order to maintain supply and demand balance and also 
the overall integrity of the system. TSO or DSO can curtail the production of any RES-
E if system security is at risk. In the Balancing Mechanism Market, this is obtained by 
accepting the bids and offers submitted by BM units. This provides compensation if 
the RES is being curtailed. At distribution level, DSO and DG sign bilateral connection 
agreements which allow DG to be curtailed for a relatively short period of time if it 
leads to significant savings in the cost of upgrading the network to facilitate the 
connection. This also benefits the DG, since the connection cost / network charges 
will also be less. 
Promoting the active contribution of renewable production units to the provision of 
ancillary services at TSO level  
It should be encouraged a more active role of renewable production units in the provision of 
the following AS:  
• Primary reserve 
• Upward and downward reserves provision,  
• Congestion management,  
• Voltage support  
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For this purpose, adequate incentive mechanisms should be adopted at RES level 
(nowadays, RES incentives at European level are mainly applied for energy provision but not 
for AS provision). 
Special consideration deserves primary reserve contribution as, currently, is mainly provided 
exclusively by conventional units. The objective of primary control is to maintain a balance 
between generation and demand within the synchronous area. Primary control aims at 
European synchronous area operational reliability and stabilises the system frequency at a 
stationary value after a disturbance or incident in a time-frame ≤ 30 seconds, but without 
capability to completely restore system frequency and power exchange to their reference 
values. 
Considering primary control as one of the main services needed to guarantee the security of 
the electricity systems, the goal is that all generation units should provide it, if technologically 
possible. So far, this requirement might be seen in the short term as a RES penetration 
barrier, but in the long term, TSO’s expected higher trust of the RES units performance, 
might allow for a higher RES penetration degree. 
In order to encourage more fluctuating/intermittent production in the system, TSOs should 
allow transfers of reserve requirements between different generation units (when it is not 
technologically possible to provide it), by means of bilateral agreements. Thus, primary 
reserve requirement should be shared between all generation units connected to the system. 
Next, requirements for the participation of RES/DG units in Ancillary Services markets in 
some European systems are described. In the Netherlands, only units larger than 5 MW and 
connected to the 1 kV voltage network or higher could provide ancillary services.  Bids of 
positive or negative power to the regulating and reserve power market should have a 
minimum size of 5 MW. The Network Code does not discriminate between power generation 
units (conventional and RES/DG), apart from the section that refers to the provision of 
primary and balancing services. Specifically, generation units that cannot be regulated, or in 
other words, that are solely dependent on one or more uncontrollable energy sources, are 
exempted from the obligation of providing primary response and reserve power services. 
Therefore, these units are not obliged to meet the respective technical requirements about 
frequency response and reactive power provision. Units with capacity smaller than 5 MW do 
not qualify for primary response anyway. 
In Spain, every RES/DG unit, with the exception of PV, have two options to sell their 
production: they can receive a feed-in tariff, or they can participate in enter the spot market 
or establish bilateral or long-term contracts, and receive a premium over the market price. PV 
only receives a feed-in tariff. The RES/DG generators that may access the AS markets are 
those that sell their output at the energy market or through bilateral contracts, are 
 55
controllable, and have a size of at least 10 MW. This capacity can be reached through 
aggregation of smaller units. Regarding reactive power remuneration framework, every unit 
under the “Special Regime” (CHP and RES below 50 MW) is given an incentive to keep their 
power factor between certain regulated ranges. 
In the United Kingdom, every generation unit with a capacity higher than 100 MW is obliged 
to take part in the provision of primary reserve. The secondary and tertiary reserve markets 
are voluntary. RES/DG units smaller than 100 MW are able to offer a few selected reserve 
and/or response services, as part of an aggregated group (where the minimum group size is 
3 MW). In the energy markets, any generator which signs up to the Balancing and Settlement 
Code (BSC – essentially a code of conduct for use of the wholesale and balancing markets 
and a commitment to pay related charges) can participate in the energy markets directly. 
Generators under 100MW are not obliged to sign up to the BSC. Those that do not will 
typically form a Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) with another larger entity already trading 
in the energy market. For small generation connected to the distribution networks, the PPA 
will be combined with an Energy Supplier. The Energy Supplier will net the total output from 
distributed generators with their demand requirements in a particular area. The generator will 
be paid a fixed amount (£/MWh), independent of time of output. Typically, RES/DG units will 
choose to take a long term PPA with an Energy Supplier to hedge risk of imbalance in the 
wholesale markets. Aggregation for participation in AS/SS markets is only allowed for some 
selected reserve services. 
In Germany up to 95% of RES-E are connected to the distribution system. The grid codes 
are binding for the connection to the transmission system, but not for the distribution system.  
Thus, RES-E generators do not necessarily have to comply with the grid codes and often do 
not do so. 
As for whether RES/DG generation installed before the entry into force of these requirements 
are obliged or not to comply with them, the situation varies across countries. In Germany, the 
last amendment of the grid code is from 2004. Old RES/DG do not have to be retrofitted. In 
Spain, the obligation to be connected to a generation control centre or to be controllable in 
order to participate in AS markets is compulsory for every RES/DG unit regardless of its age. 
Wind farms that began to operate after 1 January 2008 are mandated to comply with the 
voltage dips riding requirements. Installations that started producing before this date must be 
adapted to do so before 1 January 2010 unless it is technically impossible for them to fulfil 
these requirements. In this case, they must communicate and justify this to the authorities 
before 1 January 2009. 
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Summary of main recommendations 
Harmonizing, at European level, the technical requirements to be met by RES units and 
encouraging an active role of RES units in providing AS are two very important key elements 
of a new system that is able to cope with intermittent generation in each European country. 
5.2.5 Other initiatives indirectly related to balancing mechanisms 
Additional initiatives not directly related to balancing mechanisms, but that have been judged 
as important, as well as key elements for TSOs to admit and handle much higher levels of 
RES connected into the European system are: 
• Increase of interconnection capacity with other TSOs (subject to environmental 
constraints): for this purpose it is possible to carry out interconnection rated voltage 
upgrades (for instance 220 kV interconnector’s upgrade to 400 kV), usage of series 
capacitors, FACTS devices, etc.  
• Monitoring in real time line temperature in order to take optimally advantage of all 
transmission capability. 
• Considering RES contributions and use for handling intermittency impacts at both 
distribution and transmission planning levels 
See below a summarizing, Table 5.1, providing an overview of necessary regulatory and 
technical changes and steps to facilitate the integration of RES/DG encouraging the adoption 
of and incentivises the above discussed system improvements. 
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Table 5.1. Summary of main recommended regulatory improvements on TSO balancing   
Regulatory 
initiative 
Barrier  Recommendations 
Short term Medium term Long term 
Economic 
incentives to 
promote the 
entrance of new 
flexible generation 
in the system and 
to obtain higher 
flexibility levels 
from already 
connected 
generation units 
Variable and 
unpredicted  
changes in the 
output of RES/DG 
power plants 
should be covered 
Encourage transient operation at lower minimum output levels 
during short periods of time 
Economic incentives (≤ 1 year): to encourage availability of 
generation units 
  Economic incentives 
(≥ 1 year): to 
encourage investment 
on flexible generation 
capacity 
Promote a more active role of demand  
side in balancing services in the system 
Access to ancillary service markets for demand side providers 
 Encourage storages devices in the system 
Control of customer equipment 
Harmonize 
balancing services 
throughout  
Europe, promoting 
balancing 
coordinated 
actions among 
TSOs. 
Lack of 
harmonization at 
European level of 
balancing services 
Harmonize deviation pricing mechanisms (they should 
encourage forecast tools improvement) 
  Harmonize at 
European level day-
ahead market and 
intraday gate closure 
times 
Implement explicit interconnection capacity auctions and 
reserve trading mechanisms  throughout interconnections  
Creation of balancing perimeters and RES production 
aggregators 
Harmonize at 
European level 
technical pre-
requisites to be 
fulfilled by RES 
units  
Lack of 
harmonization at 
European level of 
technical 
requirements for 
RES generation   
Withstand without disconnection a pre-specified voltage and 
frequency dips 
Increase the level of RES units observability from TSO´s  (and 
RES integration in a control center) 
To be willing to obey real time instructions from TSO; for 
instance, real time generation reductions for security reasons. 
 Controllability tests: capability to 
keep a given schedule 
 
To encourage at 
European  level an 
active role of RES 
units for providing 
AS 
Lack of 
contribution of 
RES units  for 
providing AS 
Contribute to voltage control tasks at 
Transmission level 
 
Contribute to load following tasks at Transmission level  
(primary, secondary and tertiary reserves), and congestion 
management 
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6 Regional markets 
One big problem is that European and national targets are partly contradictory. Another one 
is that national solutions have to be developed for European targets. Instead, the 
development of European goals at European level (uniform solutions and joint 
implementation) should take place in cooperation with national regulatory authorities1. 
6.1 Increase in interconnection capacity 
Building interconnection capacity between countries within the Integrated Energy Markets 
(IEM) of EU has been identified as a prerequisite in order for economic or reliability power 
exchanges to take place between these countries. However, several obstacles lie in the way 
of constructing additional cross-border capacity. Next, regulatory recommendations are 
provided that may prove to be useful in overcoming these barriers. Taking into account the 
average construction time of transmission lines, new interconnection capacity projected now 
could only be available in the medium to long term. According to D6 report of the RESPOND 
project, and other experts this measure would surely contribute to increase efficient cross-
border power exchanges in all the EU countries.  
6.1.1 Impact of new transmission lines on the environment 
Social and political opposition to the construction of electricity transmission lines is ever 
growing stronger. Many consider these lines as damaging for the environment while not 
bringing any benefit to the areas it crosses. Environmental concerns are deemed to be an 
obstacle to the construction of new lines in the UK and Spain. Next, some recommendations 
are provided in order to overcome existing opposition related to the environmental effect of 
lines. 
In order to make lines more environmentally friendly, many countries have already decided to 
bury new interconnection lines (as it is the case for the new cross-border lines between 
France and Spain). This may be effective in reducing social opposition to these lines. 
However, one must bear in mind that burying cross-border lines usually involves using DC 
instead of AC interconnectors. This, in turn, has major implications in the operation of power 
systems (for example, automatic primary regulation support by neighbouring systems in the 
presence of power unbalances within a certain one caused by a contingency would not be 
possible through these interconnectors). Besides, this option is significantly more expensive 
than building overhead interconnection lines. This alternative could be available in the long 
 
1 This issue is recently considered in the Third Liberalization Package of the European Commission, 
ec.europa.eu/energy/index_en.htm 
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term, since burying an interconnection line, either an existing or a new one, is a major 
infrastructure project. Burying interconnection lines will not be possible unless all the 
countries involved in the construction of the line agree on it. Therefore, this measure must be 
taken in a coordinated way. This measure could be implemented in any country and has in 
fact been implemented in large parts of some (like The Netherlands) for internal (distribution) 
lines. 
Another option, involves providing some sort of economic compensation to countries where a 
line is going to be built that will not significantly benefit local agents. Different types of 
payments are possible: inter-TSO payments compensating for the cost of this lines are of 
course necessary (as explained in the next section) but, also, the implementation of a 
mechanism of side payments between countries, whereby those countries benefiting from 
the construction of a new line in a third one agree to pay the latter some extra 
compensations in order for it to accept the construction of the this line, would be possible. 
Their application should be studied and has been already proposed in (Coase, 1960). This 
recommendation could be implemented in the short term to medium term and could allow 
speeding the process of building new lines. Some countries could pay side compensations in 
order to get a line built while others not. Therefore, this measure is not intrinsically a 
coordinated one. However, the free riding problem may deter the former from paying 
compensations when others do not. Therefore, implementing a coordinated method to 
compute these compensations could be necessary in order for them to be applied. Paying 
these compensations may make sense in any country, since national laws are unlikely to 
prevent them. 
Besides side compensations, congestion rents corresponding to cross-border lines could be 
used to finance the construction of new lines and pay compensations to countries where 
these lines will be built and are negatively affected by them. This option may also be difficult 
to apply in practice, since choosing the project to be financed with the rents from a different 
line could be a politically sensitive issue. This recommendation could be implemented in the 
medium to short term. This measure needs to be implemented in a coordinated way in all the 
countries of the region, since some coordination is needed in order to decide which lines 
should be built wit the money resulting from congestion rents. Compensations may have to 
be paid to those countries that are not benefitted by the construction of lines financed with 
regional congestion rents.  
Better informing the public of the wide benefits brought about by lines that cross their territory 
would also be necessary, though this measure alone will not be sufficient, in general, to 
make those opposing the construction of beneficial regional lines change their mind. This 
option could also be implemented in the short to medium term. Information could be provided 
by countries on an uncoordinated basis. This measure could be implemented in any country. 
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6.1.2 Allocation of the cost of new investments to countries (TSOs) involved 
The allocation of the cost of regional grid reinforcements may be a matter of concern for 
promoters of these projects and policymakers. The cost of transmission lines in general (and 
therefore that of congested corridors in particular) is allocated to member states in the IEM 
using an inter-TSO compensation (ITC) scheme whose results cannot be considered 
indisputable. Some countries argue that beneficiaries of a certain line are not necessarily the 
ones who end-up paying for it. This, of course, may cause them to oppose the construction 
of this line. This is believed to be a barrier today for the construction of new lines in the UK 
and Spain. 
Therefore, implementing an ITC scheme that allocates the cost of regional lines 
proportionally to the benefit each country obtains from it would be a necessary tool and 
incentive for potential investors and users. As measuring economic benefits produced by 
lines is generally regarded as a very complex task, normally electrical usage is accepted as a 
proxy to these benefits. Then, an ITC method that is capable of computing the use that the 
agents within a country make of each regional line should be the used as the base to 
compute ITCs, see [Olmos et al., 2007] for a discussion on the subject. Given the difficulty to 
reach an agreement on the ITC method to use, this measure could only be implemented in 
the medium term (a year or two). This method must necessarily be implemented in all the 
countries at the same time, since the method to apply must be common to all the countries in 
the region.  
6.1.3 Encouraging countries to allow the construction of those lines that 
benefit others 
Benefits from the construction of cross-border lines are many times, much widespread. If the 
cost, and the environmental harm, born by a country where a line is to be built is higher than 
the benefit it gets from this line, this country will oppose its construction unless satisfactorily 
compensated. This is deemed to be a serious obstacle to the construction of new lines in 
Spain, the UK and the Netherlands. 
Therefore, contributions to the cost of these lines should also be allocated based on the use 
of an ITC scheme. This could be implemented in the medium term and in a coordinated way. 
Besides, compensations should be paid to those countries that oppose the construction of 
lines. These compensations should be commensurate with the costs/environmental harm 
caused by the lines in this country. Otherwise, some countries could take advantage of the 
situation to extract large monopoly rents in order to allow the construction of lines in their 
territory. Therefore, strong regional regulatory bodies should exist with executive powers 
over regional issues. Again, this measure should probably also be implemented in a 
coordinated way. Compensations could be paid in any country. Funds for compensating 
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countries could come from congestion rents corresponding to interconnection lines in the 
region. This measure could be implementable in the medium term, like the previous one. 
However, strong regional regulatory institutions are unlikely to be in place in the short term 
although the North-West European regional cooperation seems increasingly effective last 
year.  
6.1.4 Complexity of the process aimed at obtaining construction permits 
The complexity of the permit process, where every involved country must accept the 
construction of a regional transmission line is also regarded as a major obstacle in order to 
achieve the construction of these lines. This is a barrier to the construction of interconnection 
lines in Spain, the UK and Denmark. Similarly to what has been explained before, a regional 
regulatory authority, independent from national governments should have executive powers 
over the construction of regional lines when a conflict between several national states arises. 
Implementing such an institution would only be possible in the long term and should be the 
result of a regional agreement. If the line is built, countries negatively affected by it whose 
territory is going to be crossed by it should be appropriately compensated. 
Besides this, authorities within each country in charge of authorising European scale 
transmission lines should be unique. Local governments should not be able to veto the 
construction of these lines when it has been approved by the corresponding national 
government. Again, changing national legislation in this regard could only be achievable in 
the medium to long term. Each country could separately determine the authority in charge of 
deciding over the construction of interconnection lines. This measure could be implemented 
in all countries. 
6.1.5 Harmonization of national market rules 
Lack of harmonization of market rules, which prevents agents from some countries from 
accessing other national markets, renders the construction of new cross-border lines among 
these countries less important. This barrier is explicitly acknowledged in the UK. 
Mechanisms for the efficient allocation of interconnection capacity between countries should 
be put in place. These may include the harmonization of some minimum rules, though the 
operation of national markets could remain highly independent. National market rules to be 
harmonized should be those affecting the ability of external agents to acquire the 
transmission capacity required by them to trade their energy in a certain country (for 
example, national markets gate closure times). This recommendation could be implemented 
in the medium term (a couple of years) but, given the fact that the dispatch must be 
coordinated, it should be implemented in a coordinated way on all those interconnections 
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whose capacity must be jointly allocated. See the next section for a more in depth discussion 
of this subject.  
6.2 Coordination of the operation of regional markets 
Unless the operation between neighbouring national power markets in a region is not 
coordinated to some extent by a regional Authority, i.e. a regional TSO, cross border power 
exchanges will not be able to take place. Even if we assume that some coordination between 
neighbouring TSO on a voluntary basis already takes place nowadays it is certainly not 
sufficient. A on legal grounds authority is needed otherwise disputes and uncertainty and 
high risks may prevent countries (TSOs) from fully exploiting the potential for efficient 
commercial exchanges at regional EU level. This must be regarded an issue of highest 
priority in EU countries today.  
6.2.1 Efficient allocation of cross border capacity in the short term by implicit 
auctions 
Implicit auctions are superior to explicit ones to allocate the interconnection capacity between 
countries in the short-term (day-ahead or intraday energy markets). However, the former 
generally require more coordination among national markets than explicit ones. Thus, many 
countries still do not apply short term implicit auctions on their borders with other IEM 
countries. Besides, even when implicit auctions are run on one border, the allocation of 
capacity in this auction is normally not coordinated with that in other borders, which is highly 
necessary in order to increase the efficiency of the final energy dispatch. The format of short 
term capacity auctions is thought to be a problem for the interconnection capacity between 
France and Spain and most borders of Germany and the Netherlands. 
Coordinated implicit auctions are already being run in some sub-regions like NORDEL or the 
France-Belgium-the Netherlands one. These should be extended to other areas in Europe. In 
order to run efficient coordinated implicit auctions in meshed grids, like the one in the 
European central Plato, two options are possible: either a complex iterative process between 
the national dispatches in the different countries is implemented, or a single auctioneer is 
created and empowered with the ability to centrally allocate interconnection capacity in the 
region. We believe the latter option is superior to the previous one, and therefore, back the 
EFET proposal1 to create a regional system operator that would undertake this and other 
functions. Both alternatives to amend the existing situation could only be implemented in the 
long term. Coordinated implicit auctions could be implemented in all countries if an iterative 
 
1 A practical step towards an internal electricity market: EFET proposal for a market in cross-border 
electricity transmission capacity rights. Press Release 34/07, 28th September 2007. European 
Federation of Electricity Traders. 
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process is run. If they are run by a central auctioneer, its implementation would be more 
difficult in those systems where there are strong national market institutions (like Spain or 
Germany). 
6.2.2 Efficient allocation of cross border capacity in the longer term by 
coordinated multilateral explicit auctions  
In the longer run, coordinated explicit auctions involving the different countries in the region 
are necessary. However, no single example of a coordinated explicit auction scheme 
involving several countries has been reported within the European market (all countries 
affected but the UK). This probably has to do with the fact that multi-country explicit auctions 
in the central plato in continental Europe would require a high level of centralization of the 
capacity allocation process. A central auctioneer should probably run these auctions. Several 
options are discussed in (Pérez-Arriaga et al, 2005) for the implementation of explicit 
auctions in the IEM. These type of auctions could only be implemented in the long run. 
Problems to implement these auctions in certain countries would be similar to those faced 
when implementing coordinated implicit auctions in the short run.  
Besides this, firm transmission rights should be awarded to agents paying for firm 
transmission capacity and signing firm contracts. These transactions should have priority 
over any other kind of transaction and their enforcement should be made possible through 
the implementation of regional regulatory bodies like a regional energy regulator and the 
European Commission. Transmission rights of this type could start being issued in the 
medium term. Given that these rights would refer to interconnection capacity on several 
borders, the use of these rights should probably be launched in a coordinated way in the 
different countries in the region. 
6.3 Summary of the recommendations 
Table 6.1 summarises the main recommendations on the functioning of regional markets 
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Table 6.1. Summary of main recommendations for better functioning of regional markets 
Market 
Response Barrier Recommendations 
 Short term Medium term Long term 
Increase 
Interconnection 
Capacity (D, SP, 
UK, NL) 
Impact of new 
lines on the 
environment (UK, 
SP) 
Use of congestion rents to finance new 
lines (coordination necessary) 
More public information on the benefits 
of lines 
Bury new 
interconnection 
lines (coordination 
necessary) 
Inefficient 
allocation of the 
cost of cross-
border lines (UK, 
SP) 
 
Use of an ITC 
scheme based on 
the identification 
of beneficiaries of 
lines (coordination 
necessary) 
 
Benefits of lines 
wide-spread (SP, 
UK, NL) 
 
Use of an efficient 
ITC scheme 
(coordination 
necessary) 
Side 
compensations 
paid to countries 
Creation of strong 
regional 
regulatory bodies 
(coordination 
necessary) 
Complexity of the 
process aimed at 
obtaining permits 
(SP, UK, DK) 
 
 
Regional 
regulatory bodies 
that decide over 
new lines 
(coordination 
necessary) 
Centralization of decisions over the 
approval of interconnection projects 
within each country 
 
Lack of 
harmonization of 
national market 
rules (UK) 
 
Mechanisms for 
efficient allocation 
of interconnection 
capacity 
(coordination 
necessary) 
 
Coordination of 
the operation of 
regional markets 
(UK, SP, NL, D, 
DK) 
Inefficient 
allocation of 
capacity in the 
short term ( inter-
connection 
between France 
and Spain, D, NL) 
  
Implementation of 
efficient 
coordinated 
implicit auctions: 
central auctioneer 
or iterative 
process (some 
level of 
coordination 
necessary) 
Inefficient 
allocation of 
interconnection 
capacity in the 
long term ( 
interconnection 
between Portugal 
and Spain, D, UK, 
NL, DK) 
 
Firm transmission 
rights paid to 
agents signing 
firm supply 
contracts 
(coordination 
necessary) 
Coordinated 
explicit auction 
scheme run by 
central auctioneer 
(coordination 
necessary) 
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7 Transmission networks 
7.1 Locationally and temporally differentiated 
transmission charges 
Promotors of RES and RES/DG generators should take into account the transmission grid 
costs that the system will incur as a result of their decision to install a new plant in a certain 
node. Grid locational signals are useful in any case (both for conventional and RES/DG 
generation). Their only objective is allowing promoters to see an additional cost component 
(the cost of building the grid) that was not being considered before. This, together with other 
signals should result in optimal global decisions by generation promoters. This cost may vary 
greatly from one point of the grid to another. Thus, transmission tariffs paid by generators or 
loads could exhibit some sort of locational differentiation. Otherwise, transmission costs may 
increase significantly as a result of the installation of this type of generators even if it is not 
necessary for them to do so at this place. 
The cost of installing a new plant may clearly depend on the operation profile of this plant. 
Thus, if this plant produces power when local demand is maximum it may be able to reduce 
the amount of new import transmission capacity into the area to be built in the future. On the 
other hand, if its peak production takes place when local demand is minimum, additional 
transmission capacity may be needed to transport this power to other parts of the system. 
Hence, one can conclude that the level of the transmission tariff to be paid by a generator 
should depend on the production profile that the generator is deemed to have. 
Parties in Europe tend to agree that, if transmission charges were differentiated by time and 
space, differences among charges paid in different nodes/areas and by different types of 
generators could be significant, thus affecting investment decisions by agents. However, 
there are other parties that think these charges would not represent and incentive strong 
enough to affect agents’ decisions. 
Implementing locationally and temporally differentiated transmission charges is attainable 
only in the medium term. Only generators in the UK pay Use of the system transmission 
charges that exhibit some sort of temporal and locational differentiation. Generators in 
Denmark, Spain and the Netherlands pay connection charges with locational and/or temporal 
differentiation. Therefore, this measure still needs to be implemented in the remaining cases. 
At the national level the goal seems to optimize the grid load and the need to minimize grid 
expansion respectively. Due to different national conditions of production (solar, wind, hydro, 
etc) a reallocation may be expensive and inefficient. Therefore it is important to optimize the 
overall system (network cost, environmental impact, production conditions). For conventional 
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power plants an allocation impact may be possible. In contrast, CHP and renewable power 
plants are hard to relocate due to their local dependencies. 
7.1.1 Volatility of charges 
Some parties have expressed the view that charges resulting from the application of 
temporally and locationally differentiated tariffs may turn out to be too volatile. Even 
differences in tariffs between nodes or points in time that are close could be significant. This 
has been pointed out in the Netherlands as a significant obstacle. 
In order for the economic signals produced by transmission tariffs to be effective in driving 
decisions by agents, these should not be volatile. This could be achieved by implementing 
zonal tariffs, i.e. tariffs that are homogeneous over some zones of the system that are 
predetermined but can be periodically updated. Besides, tariffs should be computed for each 
operation profile in advance of the time frame that these tariffs refer to. Therefore, these 
tariffs would not depend on the actual use or benefit that agents get from the grid, but on the 
expected one. All this should result in these tariffs being fairly stable. Taking into account the 
opposition that the application of locationally differentiated tariffs will face, these measures 
could only be implemented in the medium term. Its application could take place separately in 
each country, though, if locational signals at regional level are to be given, then some 
coordination should exist. Computing zonal prices from nodal ones should be acceptable in 
any system. 
7.1.2 Discrimination between agents 
Applying different charges to different generators based on their type or operation profile and 
their location is seen by some as a source of unfair discrimination. Discrimination between 
old and new generators is also seen as unfair in some cases. This is pointed out as a major 
barrier in the Netherlands and Germany. 
Despite this common belief, nothing can be deemed more reasonable and fair than making 
each agent (or group of agents, if zonal tariffs are applied) responsible for the cost (in this 
case, the network cost) that it makes the system incur. Otherwise, cross-subsidies would 
exist between agents that are efficient in terms of their situation in the grid and operation 
profile, and agents that are not. This should be deemed a cause of unfair discrimination. 
Comparable examples can be found in many other cases (price of households is not the 
same in different regions, why should the price of energy, or the level of network tariffs be the 
same?). Demonstration projects on the applicability and benefits of this type of initiatives 
should be launched. Heavy marketing of this type of policies could also help overcome 
political/social opposition. These measures could be implemented in the short term in any of 
the affected countries on separate basis. Additionally, in order for those who cannot afford 
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large transmission charges not to be left without supply, special provisions (social 
transmission and energy charges) could apply to them. The latter measure could probably be 
implemented in the medium term. Again, social tariffs should be implementable in any 
system and systems could consider its application regardless of the situation in any other 
one. 
7.1.3 Level of incentives for installation of new DG: comparison with 
transmission charges 
According to others, the large size of the feed-in tariffs that are presently being applied to 
RES generation may discourage RES operators from taking into account grid locational 
signals when deciding on the location of their plants, since these plants would turn out to be 
very profitable no matter where they are installed. This is seen as a potential problem for 
system operation in Spain. 
In order to overcome this problem, energy prices earned by RES producers should be 
commensurate with the benefit they bring about to the system. Thus, premiums, instead of 
FITs, are preferable. Premiums could be implemented in any country, though, in order not to 
distort competition, support mechanisms in different countries should be homogeneous. So 
some level of coordination is necessary. Second, the level of these tariffs should be adjusted 
so as to achieve the level of RES capacity required or, alternatively, a RES obligation 
scheme could be implemented where RES technologies could compete ones against the 
others. These measures could be implemented in the medium term. Finally, in this situation, 
locationally differentiated charges could probably make the difference between installing a 
RES plant in one part of the grid and installing it in another one, since expected differences 
in network charges between different points of a system, resulting from the application of an 
efficient tariff setting process, have proved to be comparable in size to other potential 
locational signals like the impact of operation decisions on losses.  
7.1.4 Complexity of the network regulation 
Finally, there is also the concern that implementing a system of nodal/zonal transmission 
tariffs may substantially increase the complexity of the system regulation and that of the 
monitoring of the system functioning, thus making it less attractive in policymakers view. This 
is perceived as a problem in the UK. 
Using simple methods to compute transmission tariffs, like the so-called Average 
Participation one, presented in (Bialek, 1996; Kirschen, 1997), that are based on the 
application for simple rules, and whose results can be predicted within a certain error margin, 
should not be perceived as a significant increase in the complexity of the tariff setting 
process. Simple methods would be favoured by authorities in any country. Their application 
would not need to be coordinated. If tariffs were computed for a limited number of zones and 
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technologies (operation profiles), the complexity of the process would be smaller. Applying 
these measures should be possible in the medium term. Reducing the number of tariff zones 
and technology profiles in their computation is deemed to be acceptable anywhere, since this 
would result in more predictable tariffs. This does not need to take place as a coordinated 
process.  
7.2 Grid reinforcements 
Installing new RES generators may require reinforcing the transmission grid. However, 
political and social opposition to the construction of new lines has been growing significantly. 
Besides, delays in the process to be followed to obtain the required permits may represent 
another important obstacle.  
Significant socio-political opposition is faced nowadays by promoters of new transmission 
lines in most European countries. This has resulted in a significant delay in the construction 
of some lines. Average time for the construction of new lines ranges from 3 years (Spain, 
UK’s best case) to 10 years (NL, D, UK’s worst case). Building new grid lines is only possible 
in the long term. However, significant reinforcements to the grid are (and will be) necessary 
in all the considered countries. 
Some general measures can be considered, like the use of side payments between regions 
so that the one where a line should be built is compensated for the cost (environmental and 
any other type) that it may bear due to the existence of this line. 
7.2.1 Impact on health and the environment of new lines 
Main concerns raised by local/regional governments and associations of consumers/network 
users about new transmission lines are environmental and those related to the effect of lines 
on health. This has proved to be a major barrier in the Netherlands, Spain and Germany. In 
order to overcome it, many new lines have had to be buried, which can only be accomplished 
in the long term. This certainly reduces the strength of the field caused by transmission lines 
around human beings. However, it also significantly increases the cost and the technical 
complexity of the investment projects, which may, in turn, become a major barrier to the 
construction of new lines. This measure has already been implemented in most countries like 
Denmark, The Netherlands or Spain, especially in urban areas. Coordination between 
countries would not be necessary in this case. 
Research and development in order to develop more efficient processes to bury lines and, 
maybe, the sharing of transmission lines rights of way with lines used for other purposes 
(communications, other commodities, etc.) may contribute to reduce the cost of this type of 
projects. Developing more efficient ways to bury lines could only be possible in the long term. 
Sharing rights of way with other type of infrastructures can only be implemented in the long 
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term as well. These two measures could be implementable in any system and this measure 
could be considered separately for each country. 
7.2.2 Efficiency of the cost allocation of new lines 
Other concerns are related to the allocation of the cost of new network investments, which is 
deemed not to be efficient in many systems. This is perceived a major barrier in the UK. 
Methods that seek the efficiency in the allocation of the cost of lines to their users should be 
implemented. Economics theory dictates that the cost of lines should be allocated to those 
who benefit from them in proportion to the benefit each obtains. Computing these benefits 
may be difficult but there are some cost allocation methods that offer a reasonable proxy to 
beneficiaries methods, see (Olmos et al., 2007). Implementing these methods would be 
possible in the medium term. Implementing efficient network charges could be difficult in 
those systems where transmission tariffs must be the same for all network users of the same 
type by law (Spain for consumers, The Netherlands). Methods applied in different countries 
could be different as long as they are all reasonable. 
7.2.3 Efficiency of the use of transmission capacity within each system 
Some parties are worried about the possibility that the already existing transmission capacity 
is not being allocated efficiently. This reduces the benefit that agents may extract from the 
construction of new lines. This happens to be a major problem in the UK. In order for this not 
to happen, coordinated market based methods, which allocate capacity to those agents that 
value it most, and therefore are willing to pay the highest congestion charges, should be 
implemented. Nodal or zonal prices are probably the best option in this regard, as the next 
section explains. Changing capacity allocation methods would be possible in the medium 
term in some countries like Germany if significant congestion arises. Its application could be 
more difficult in others like Spain due to social opposition. If significant congestion exists 
within a country, the allocation of local and interconnection capacity should take place jointly 
in a coordinated way with other countries. 
7.2.4 Profitability of proposed reinforcements 
Finally, the profitability of the investment projects in the current conditions is also under 
scrutiny. This may be a problem in the UK. In order for investments to be efficient, the 
expansion of the grid should be centrally planned by an institution looking after the interest of 
society (encouraged to do so through regulation). This institution could probably be an active 
TSO, like that existing in England and Wales, whose incentives are carefully designed. 
Authors in (Olmos, 2006) analyse the incentive scheme to be applied to TSOs. The planning 
process for the expansion of the grid could be changed in the medium term separately for 
each country. 
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7.3  Congestion management schemes 
The installation of RES generation in far remote areas (for example wind farms both off-
shore and on-shore) may produce congestion in the system. Apart from this, if the amount of 
new generation located within an area is significantly larger than demand and/or the pattern 
of power production by this generation is poorly correlated with that of demand in the area, 
additional congestion may arise because of the installation of DG. Under these 
circumstances, efficiently allocating the scarce transmission capacity may become even 
more urgent. Otherwise, welfare losses may occur. Most parties agree that introducing some 
market based method to solve congestion is highly advisable. 
With the exception of Denmark (prices for the two separate areas that have been defined in 
this system are computed through implicit auctions that take place at regional level in the 
Nord Pool day-ahead market, as described above), no system within the ones analysed is 
applying nodal/zonal pricing to solve congestion within their systems. Therefore, the 
implementation of this type of methods should be investigated in the Netherlands, Spain, 
Germany and the UK. Changing congestion management methods is possible in the medium 
term. 
7.3.1 Compatibility with national regulation 
Congestion management schemes that provide efficient price signals may be incompatible 
with national regulation in place in some countries, which may require computing a single 
energy price for the whole system. The regulation in place in several countries does not allow 
different energy prices to be charged to consumers based on their location. This is the case 
of Spain, where prices earned by generators are allowed to be different, nevertheless, and 
that of the Netherlands, where the grid code and the system code would have to be 
significantly changed to apply nodal/zonal prices. 
Similarly to what is stated for transmission charges, pricing the energy produced and 
consumed by agents according to the value it has for the system, which clearly depends on 
the location and time of production or consumption, is reasonable and would lead to 
significant gains in the efficiency of the energy dispatch (at least, assuming no significant 
market power exists). Otherwise, cross subsidies between more or less efficient generators 
and demands, based on their location and profile, will occur. Those consumers in an 
expensive importing area that cannot afford energy prices could be subsidised through social 
energy tariffs. This measure can be implemented in the medium term in any country in an 
uncoordinated way (consumers with social tariffs would not be competing against one other). 
If, despite this, implementing locational energy prices for load is not possible, at least its 
application for generators should be considered. This can be done in the medium term as 
well. Applying different energy prices to generators (zonal prices) would be possible in Spain, 
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Germany or The Netherlands only if very significant congestion arises. The mechanism used 
to compute these charges should probably consider the existence of congestion on 
interconnections between countries. 
7.3.2 Incentives from nodal/zonal prices to increase the exercise of Market 
Power 
According to most of the consulted parties that have been consulted, market power exercise 
would be exacerbated if energy prices within congested areas were computed separately 
from those of the rest of the system. This is true even for parties in those systems where 
zonal pricing is already in place, like Denmark. Therefore, the effect of applying nodal/zonal 
prices on market power is perceived as a significant barrier in all considered countries. This 
is related to the fact that generators able to solve most of the existing grid congestion belong 
to one or very few companies, as a result of the decrease in the size of the relevant market 
when nodal/zonal pricing is applied. 
Instead of applying nodal energy prices, zonal prices could be computed (see comments on 
their application made before). This would increase the size of areas whose prices are set 
independently from the rest of the system as a consequence of the existence of congestion, 
which should result in an increase in the number and size of competitors for any energy 
producer and, therefore, a reduction in market power. This measure can be implemented in 
the medium term. 
Besides, different energy prices should only be computed to value systematic grid 
congestion that affects large parts of the system. This again, should result in larger price 
areas than in the case of local grid constraints. Therefore, the price of these areas should be 
more difficult to unilaterally modify. Again, modifying the scheme used to compute prices 
would be possible in the medium term in all countries but Denmark, where some changes to 
the zonal pricing scheme already used could be introduced in the short term (like the splitting 
of Western Denmark into two different price areas – Energinet.dk 2007). As mentioned 
before, the application of zonal prices should be coordinated among countries.   
7.3.3 Complexity of the market clearing process 
Last, but not least, the complexity of the process of computing zonal/nodal prices is also 
cited by some parties as an important difficulty to be overcome in the process of 
implementation of these methods. For some countries, like Spain, the process of 
coordination of the market dispatch at regional level would be much more difficult if several 
prices would have to be computed at national level. For some other systems, like the Dutch 
one, splitting up the imbalance settlement according to price areas and changing computer 
systems represent non-negligible challenges. 
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In order to reduce the complexity of the market clearing process, some centralized institution 
could be in charge of determining, according to aggregate energy/capacity bids by agents, 
what is the optimal use to be made of interconnection capacity. This option could probably 
only be implemented in the long term, since creating a central auctioneer is politically very 
challenging. This would be a coordinated response to this barrier. Fierce opposition to 
applying this coordinated dispatch could arise in many countries (all those countries 
considered but Denmark and maybe the UK). 
The alternative to this, in meshed regions, would be implementing some sort of iterative 
process involving separately computed national dispatches whose complexity would certainly 
be significant. This could be implemented in the medium term, though significant 
implementation problems would arise. Less coordination would be needed and it would 
implementable in almost any country. 
If congestion is persistent and predictable, predetermined nodal/zonal factors representing 
the difference in price between nodes or zones could be used to compute the constrained 
energy dispatched. These factors could vary depending on the time of the day, the week and 
the year and should probably be updated periodically. This, again, could be implemented in 
the medium term in England but its application in Spain, Germany or The Netherlands would 
be more difficult. Nodal factors’ values should be conditioned by the expected allocation of 
capacity in interconnections. 
7.4 Summary of the recommendations 
Table 7.1 below summarises the main recommendations on the improvements of functioning 
of the transmission network in coping with variable RES/DG generation. 
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Table 7.1. Summary of main recommendations of the functioning of the transmission network 
for coping with high shares of variable RES/DG 
Market 
Response Barrier 
Recommendations 
Short term Medium term Long term 
Locationally and 
temporally 
differentiated 
transmission 
charges (SP, D, 
DK, NL: UoS 
charges; UK: 
connection 
charges) 
Volatility of 
charges (NL)  
Implementing 
zonal 
transmission 
tariffs. 
(coordination 
advisable) 
Tariffs computed 
for each type of 
profile in advance 
of actual 
operation 
 
Discrimination 
between agents 
(NL, D) 
Demonstration 
projects for 
application of 
these tariffs 
Increase in the 
marketing of 
these charges 
Implementation of 
social 
transmission 
charges 
 
Level of DG/RES 
production 
incentives (SP) 
 
Premiums instead 
of FITs 
(coordination 
necessary) 
Adjust level of 
tariffs/ RES 
obligation scheme 
(coordination 
necessary) 
 
Complexity of the 
network 
regulation (UK) 
 
Use of simple 
methods to 
compute tariffs 
Computing tariffs 
for a limited 
number of zones 
and operation 
profiles 
 
Building new grid 
reinforcements 
(UK, SP, D, DK, 
NL) 
Impact of new 
lines on health 
and the 
environment (NL, 
SP, D) 
  
Burying new lines 
Developing new 
more efficient 
methods to bury 
them 
Sharing rights of 
way with other 
types of 
infrastructure 
Lack of efficiency 
of the cost of new 
lines (UK) 
 
Implementation of 
efficient cost 
allocation 
methods based 
on beneficiaries 
 
Lack of efficiency 
of the use of 
transmission 
capacity within 
each country (UK) 
 
Implementation of 
coordinated 
market based 
methods for 
allocation of 
transmission 
capacity 
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(coordination 
necessary) 
Disputable 
profitability of 
proposed grid 
reinforcements 
(UK) 
 
Development of 
the grid centrally 
planned by the 
TSO. Probably 
subject to 
moderate 
incentives 
 
Increase in the 
efficiency of 
congestion 
management 
methods (SP, D, 
NL, UK) 
Lack of 
compatibility of 
proposed 
schemes with 
national 
regulation (SP, 
NL) 
Implementation of social energy tariffs  
 
Application of 
efficient 
differentiated 
prices only to 
generators 
(coordination 
necessary) 
 
Incentives from 
nodal/zonal prices 
to exercise 
Market Power 
(SP, UK, DK, D, 
NL) 
 
Application of 
zonal energy 
prices 
(coordination 
necessary) 
 
Application of the recommended 
scheme only to systematic grid 
congestion in the main transmission 
system (coordination necessary) 
 
Complexity of the 
resulting market 
clearing process 
(SP, NL) 
 
Implementing an 
iterative process 
for the allocation 
of these capacity 
(at regional level) 
(some limited 
level of 
coordination 
necessary) 
Predetermined 
nodal/zonal 
factors for 
systematic 
predictable 
congestion (at 
national level) 
(some 
coordination 
necessary) 
Alternatively, 
creating a central 
auctioneer to 
allocate 
interconnection 
capacity in a 
region (at regional 
level) 
(coordination 
necessary) 
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8 Distribution networks 
Earlier in the RESPOND project, several barriers were identified regarding the integration of 
intermittent distributed and renewable energy generators in distribution networks (D6 report). 
In this section, we provide some policy and regulatory improvements to overcome some of 
these barriers or issues and to facilitating the efficient system integration of these variable 
RES/DG generation sources. For simplicity a similar analytical framework is followed as in 
report D6 of RESPOND. 
Some of the main improvements and consequently recommendations in RESPOND can be 
find in outputs of previous other European projects, which were addressing the same topics, 
i.e.  DG-GRID and SOLID-DER projects (Gómez et al., 2007 and Cossent et al., 2008). 
8.1 Locationally differentiated and time varying network 
charges 
The DG-GRID and SOLID-DER projects investigated the structure of distribution charges 
paid by DG/RES generators (both connection and use-of-system (UoS) charges) in EU-15 
and EU new member states (MS), see (Cossent et al., 2009). 
Connection charges are paid just once when a DG/RES or CHP generator requires network 
access to compensate for the costs of connection. On the other hand, UoS charges are 
periodically paid by network users (generally end consumers but also generators in some 
MS, such as in the UK and Denmark). A correct design of UoS charges and connection 
charges is a key issue to ensure fair and non-discriminatory network access. Therefore, this 
is one of the main requirements for an increase in the share of DG at European level. 
In RESPOND D6 report the current situation about this issue in the RESPOND countries was 
reported. Connection charges are shallow in some cases (UK, Netherlands for small 
generators, Denmark, and Germany) and deep in others (Spain, and Netherlands for 
generators larger than 10 MW). Under deep connection charges, DG pays for all the cost of 
connection, including upstream network reinforcements. On the other hand, under shallow 
charges DG pays only the direct costs of connection. A trade-off exists between providing 
incentives for the optimal and cost-reflective sitting of new generation (deep connection 
charges) and facilitating entry for small-sized DG operators (shallow connection charges), for 
whom these charges may otherwise be a major barrier. 
Regarding UoS charges paid by DG, only in Denmark and UK these charges are applied. 
These charges may be locationnally and time differentiated. This is the case of UK where 
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UoS distribution charges are computed according to a Distribution Reinforcement Model 
(DRM) (Ilex Energy Consulting, 2002).  
The regulatory policy recommendation to efficiently integrate DG is to implement shallow 
connection charges in Spain and Netherlands together with UoS charges including 
differentiation per location (voltage level, rural/urban areas) and time of use (peak, fall and 
valley hours) in Germany, Spain, and Netherlands. 
Connection charges should be averaged, regulated, and shallow, or at least shallowish, 
especially for small DG. The rest of the reinforcement costs can be socialized and recovered 
via UoS tariffs with location and time differentiation. Negotiation between DSOs and DG 
promoters ought to be avoided to prevent access conflicts. Discrimination can be caused 
either by the lack of unbundling between DSOs and DG ownership or by the fact that most 
DSOs regard DG as a source of problems rather than as an active element that can 
contribute to the operation of the network. 
At the same time, UoS charges should be cost reflective, in order to better reflect the actual 
costs (and benefits) for the system caused by each agent. The cost causality criterion implies 
that UoS charges can be either positive or negative, since DG may achieve cost savings 
through losses reduction, investments deferral, voltage control, etc. For instance, a generator 
could be paid when producing at local peak demand time since losses will be decreased and 
voltage kept under margins. Otherwise, the DSO operating that area would receive some 
windfall profit for this whereas the generator causing the benefit would not perceive it. 
Properly designed distribution UoS tariffs must take into account the particular features of 
networks, such as the different voltage levels, areas of distribution, metering devices 
capabilities, planning criteria and quality of service requirements (Rodríguez Ortega et al., 
2008). Nonetheless, their structure and computation methodologies should be adapted as 
DG reaches significant levels of penetration (Li et al., 2008; Sotkiewicz and Vignolo, 2007). 
8.1.1 Compatibility with national regulation 
As we have seen, only UK and Denmark are currently in line with this policy 
recommendation. In Netherlands, the main barrier for implementing locational UoS charges 
is legal because tariff codes should be changed. In Germany, allocating charges to 
generators in an efficient, cost-reflective, manner is also regarded as a challenge by 
authorities. The same kind of situation happens in Spain were generators no matter where 
they are connected, transmission or distribution, do not pay UoS network charges. A major 
change at the level of the Electricity Law would be required to modify the current situation. 
Implementing UoS charges for DG is not advisable unless conventional generators pay them 
too. Otherwise, instead of attaining the desired effects, they would represent a discriminatory 
measure against DG.  
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Another possibility to try to solve this situation is to look for the same effect through the 
already implemented support mechanisms for DG-RES and CHP. For instance, properly 
designed FITs or premiums (with location and time differentiation) can be used as a 
complement or a substitute to obtain the same results in countries where generators do not 
pay UoS network tariffs by law or regulation. 
8.1.2 Achieving stable distribution charges  
In the Netherlands, volatility of network price signals was reported as a barrier to implement 
UoS charges for DG. In general, practical applications of UoS charges are implemented 
through zonal distribution charges differentiated by voltage levels or network areas and in 
time zones as peak, flat, and valley hours. In this way, temporal and locational price volatility 
is partly avoided.  
The aforementioned required changes related to the implementation of shallow connection 
charges and UoS charges with location and time differentiation in Netherlands, Spain, and 
Germany could be adopted in most of the countries in a short to medium term framework. It 
is clear that the new UoS tariffs must be consistent with the whole regulatory framework, 
including the support schemes for renewables, in each country. 
8.2 DSOs’ incentives for active network management 
As it was stated in D6 RESPOND report, active network management (ANM) by Distribution 
System Operators (DSOs) includes real time monitoring of DG operation and communication 
with these generators so as to control them, changing the grid configuration in order to 
improve quality of service indicators and energy losses, and implementing advanced 
metering devices to facilitate the active demand response and the network management. 
The current situation in most of the countries surveyed in the RESPOND project is that DSOs 
rely mainly on traditional passive network management practices. However, most of the 
countries are already applying some sort of incentive regulation associated to the reduction 
of losses and the increase in service quality. An exception to this is Germany, where 
incentive regulation will be applied from 2009 on. The regulatory discussion is nowadays 
focussed on whether incentive regulation would be enough to achieve the desirable 
transformation from passive to active management, or by the contrary, if new additional 
regulatory measures would be needed. 
What it is clear is that, contrary to the current situation, DG observability and controllability 
should increase as “active network management” would be taken up by DSOs and thereby 
allow the system operator to take full advantage of the capabilities of DG to improve quality 
of service or defer new investments. This is illustrated in Figure 8.1 (from Djapic et al., 2007. 
c@ 2007 IEEE), where active management and coordinated centralized and decentralized 
control would allow overall system costs to decrease. As a consequence, future regulation 
should seek the promotion of network transformation to more active DSOs and be aimed at 
giving incentives for DG to participate in the provision of ancillary services and network 
support (see subsection 8.4). 
 
Figure 8.1 : Passive vs. active management of distribution networks.  
Only in the UK and Denmark, some initiatives have been launched to develop active network 
management techniques related with the efficient integration of DG. For instance, in the UK, 
the Innovation Funding Incentive (IFI) permits DSOs to spend up to 0.5% of its revenues on 
eligible IFI projects related with any distribution system asset management aspect. Secondly, 
the Registered Power Zones (RPZ) mechanism focuses on the connection of DG to 
distribution systems by using innovative and more cost effective ways. If the regulator 
accepts a proposal as RPZ, the DSOs incentive to connect DG (in the UK the DSOs 
remuneration formula includes a term expressed as ₤ per kW of DG connected) is increased 
considerably for the first five years of operation.  
The policy and regulatory recommendations in this regard are related with the 
implementation of specific incentives for DSOs to move in the right direction. 
8.2.1 Assessment of DG impact on energy losses and quality of service 
targets 
Current incentive schemes that promote improvement in quality of service levels and 
reduction of energy losses should be adapted to recognize the beneficial effect coming from 
contributions from the adequate control of DG. Here, the difficulty lies in computing the 
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impact of DG on losses and quality of service as it has been reported by the Netherlands. 
However, the use of reference network models helping the regulator to assess targets for 
quality of service indicators and energy losses reference levels can be a very useful tool to 
perform this task. Reference network models are used by the Spanish regulator when 
calculating revenue caps and incentives for distribution companies (Gómez, 2007).  
Additionally, in order to foster DG integration through innovation, specific performance 
indicators with associated economic incentives if DSOs reach specific targets, should be 
selected. For instance, the number of DG connections already integrated in the network in 
comparison with the total number of applications could be employed as a performance 
indicator.  
Both types of recommendations can be implemented in all the countries D, DK, NL, SP and 
UK in a medium term framework.  
8.2.2 Demonstration R&D projects and incentives for network transformation 
Additional research and innovation programs should be implemented aimed at developing 
technical and operational procedures for ANM where both public and private institutions 
participate. There are some examples, as that already commented in the UK, Denmark, or 
that planned in the Netherlands, where they are also considering applying this kind of 
policies to trigger a change in the paradigm of operation of distribution networks. In Spain, 
there is a national program where demonstration projects are funded by the Ministry of 
Industry together with private companies. This line of research is also viewed as a European 
research priority line known as Smartgrids under the 7th Framework Programme.  
From the point of view of the specific participation of DSOs in this kind of initiatives, or others 
in the same direction, R&D investment and costs can be included in the regulatory asset 
base as a separate item with higher rates of return or with a partial pass-through to tariffs 
that reduces the risk perceived by DSOs. In addition to this, the regulatory period to pass-
through associated gains of efficiency derived from such innovations to customers, should be 
extended.  
Both types of recommendations can be implemented in all the countries D, DK, NL, SP and 
UK in a short to medium term framework. 
8.3 DSOs incentives for taking into account DG in 
network planning 
DG-GRID and SOLID-DER (www.solid-der.org) projects investigated the way the connection 
and operation of DG can impact network design and future investments. The potential of DG 
to replace network investments is caused by the fact that DG is connected closer to end 
consumers or even on their side of the meter, thus reducing the net demand to be supplied 
through transmission and distribution grids. It is also important to acknowledge that some DG 
based on renewables, such as wind power, is not always connected close to loads. Article 
14/7 of the EU Directive 2003/54/CE requires DSOs to consider DG, together with energy 
efficiency measures and demand response, as an alternative to network expansion. 
However, designing a regulatory mechanism to take into account this possibility is not an 
easy task. 
In the RESPOND D6 report, the current situation about this issue has been described for the 
surveyed five countries. In most countries, but Germany, where a mechanism will be applied 
from 2009, an incentive regulation scheme to promote efficient investments by DSOs, as 
opposite to a cost of service regulation, has been put in place. Incentive regulation, 
theoretically, fosters DSOs’ costs reduction while keeping quality of supply and security 
standards. Under this type of regulation, the determination of a “reasonable” allowed capital 
expenditure (CAPEX) to be paid to DSOs is a critical issue. This issue still becomes more 
complicated due to the effect of DG on investment requirements. 
A novel approach has been introduced by OFGEM, the UK regulator, in the last price control 
review that allows Distribution Network Operators DNOs (it is the way DSOs are named in 
UK regulation) to choose between getting a lower CAPEX allowance but a higher expected 
return on investment (retaining more of the cost reduction if they can beat the target 
expenditure levels) or a higher CAPEX allowance combined with a lower expected return 
(OFGEM, 2004). 
Table 8.1. Matrix for UK DSOs incentives related to CAPEX (allowed vs. actual)  
 
 
According to Table 8.1, a Power Ratio Efficiency Incentive is assigned to each DSO, which is 
obtained based on the fraction of the CAPEX target selected by the company that is 
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recommended by OFGEM´s consultant (PB Power). For instance, if the DSO investment 
target exceeds 120% of the consultant target (PB power ratio of 120 in the Figure), the 
allowed CAPEX is equal to 110% and the DSO would get a bonus of 0.6% in its income in 
case the actual CAPEX match the allowed CAPEX. If the DSO´s actual CAPEX are 70% of 
the target (due to improvements in efficiency) it would get a 12.6% increase of its income as 
a reward. By the contrary, if its actual CAPEX exceeds 140% of the target, then its income 
would be reduced by 8.4%. This approach is a way of introducing incentives for DSOs to 
achieve efficiency in network investments. 
Despite this type of incentive regulation, in UK there is no evidence yet that DSOs are taking 
advantage of DG for reducing network investments. Moreover, additional measures related 
to engineering network design criteria have been implemented in order to realize the 
beneficial impact of DG. The Engineering Recommendation P2/6 (Energy Networks 
Association, 2006) acknowledges the contribution of DG to network security. This technical 
recommendation mandates DSOs to evaluate the contribution of the DG to the peak 
demand, depending on the technology and the number of DG units, when calculating 
network reinforcements. For instance, the required transformer installed capacity in a 
distribution substation could be reduced depending on the amount of DG connected in the 
distribution network supplied by that substation.  
8.3.1 Determination of investment budgets and allowance for efficiency gains 
In line with the schemes implemented in UK, our policy regulatory recommendation for 
providing incentives to DSOs for efficient investment taking into account DG integration and 
active network management is the following one. The regulator will allocate investment 
budgets for each individual DSO for the next regulatory period. This scheme leaves all 
system optimising decisions completely up to DSOs. At the end of the regulatory period, the 
DSO should inform the regulator on the network investment actually carried out. Efficiency 
gains that result in a reduction of investments investments, for instance, investment in active 
network management that integrates DG in order to postpone network reinforcements, will be 
recognized to the DSO as an allowed profit in that period. This scheme can be expensive in 
terms of regulatory control, as technical experts on behalf of the regulator should assess the 
efficiency of implemented actions. However it puts pressure on both, regulator and DSO, in 
order to take into account efficient integration of DG when allocating investment budgets. 
This type of recommendations can be implemented in countries as SP and NL in the medium 
term due to the fact that they require important changes in the review control process that 
takes place in each regulatory period every four or five years. As it has been previously 
commented upon, regulatory tools that can be used for assessing investment efficiency are 
reference network models, like the one that is going to be used by the Spanish regulator. 
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8.3.2 Compatibility between support schemes and DG controllability 
Another regulatory recommendation regarding the integration of DG in the process of 
planning the expansion of the grid, is to avoid support schemes that encourage DG to 
produce as much energy as it can regardless of the specific operation conditions that exist. 
That is the case of flat Feed-in Tariffs still in force in some countries, like in SP and NL. DG 
generators in these systems are unwilling to reduce their output when it is needed by the 
system. Thus, their output cannot be controlled in the benefit of the system so as to avoid the 
construction of certain new network installations. As it has been explained previously, it is 
preferable to apply FITs or premiums with temporal differentiation (peak, flat, and valley 
hours). This policy option can be implemented in the short-term because support schemes 
are frequently reviewed in most of the countries.  
8.4 Provision of DSO ancillary services by DG 
In the DG-GRID and SOLID-DER projects the role of DG in providing ancillary services to 
Transmission System Operators (TSOs) and to DSOs was highlighted as a relevant issue. 
Electric power systems require generators to procure certain services in order to ensure their 
secure operation. These are known as ancillary services (AS), being the most relevant ones 
frequency response, power reserves, voltage and reactive control, and black start. 
Generators play a fundamental role in the provision of these services. Due to the fact that 
generation facilities have been traditionally connected to transmission networks, the 
Transmission System Operator was in charge of managing AS. However, the development of 
DG may bring similar possibilities at distribution level.  
DG units are able to provide different AS and other network services that can lead to a more 
secure and efficient operation of the distribution network (Meyer, 2007; Van Thong et al., 
2007). For instance, a more flexible operation of controllable DG according to network price 
signals can save investment or defer network reinforcements. In addition, DG can reduce the 
impact of network outages on customer supply interruptions if islanding operation is 
implemented in distribution network. Moreover, DG under local control or following system 
operation orders can provide voltage support or flow control when needed by the DSO. In 
order to implement in practice such possibilities it is required that DSOs introduce active 
network management in their distribution networks. 
In the RESPOND D6 report, the current situation in the surveyed countries regarding AS 
provision by DG is described. Regarding voltage control and power factor regulation, some 
minimum requirements are mandatory in the UK and Spain. In Spain, some additional 
remuneration can be obtained by those generators that control its power factor depending on 
the time period (peak, flat, or valley hours). In the Netherlands, the provision of AS can be 
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agreed on through bilateral contracts with the DSO or TSO with the condition that generators 
should meet some technical requirements, like controllability and fault ride through capability. 
DG may participate in the balancing market or provide reserves, mainly under aggregators. 
For instance, in Germany, Spain, and the Netherlands some Virtual Power Plants (VPPs) 
have been created to pool a number of small power plants in order to provide reserves or 
balancing energy, thus improving the participation of DG in these markets. For the time 
being, islanding is not allowed in most countries. In Denmark, only in pilot projects islanding 
operation is applied. 
8.4.1 Arrangements between DSOs and DG to provide AS 
The first policy recommendation is to establish an institutional framework that allows and 
encourages TSOs and DSOs to enter into commercial arrangements with DG promoters and 
aggregators in order to facilitate the provision of AS by these agents. However, in order for 
DG/RES to be able to effectively contribute to the provision of AS, these generators should 
have the technical capabilities that are required to provide them and be subject to strong 
enough incentives that encourage them to fulfil TS/DSO’s requests. Different approaches 
can be implemented, for instance, bilateral contracts, regulated payments to the providers of 
the service, or finally active participation in those markets specifically created for trading this 
type of services, especially, markets for operational reserves and energy balancing. 
Most of these policy alternatives can be implemented in the short to medium-term in most of 
the countries. When designing such kind of policies it is important to bear in mind some of 
the issues already identified in RESPOND D6 report as potential difficulties in their 
implementation. For instance, to ensure market liquidity (enough potential providers 
belonging to different companies) it is required to create specific AS markets. Lack of liquidity 
is not a problem in the balancing market, but can be an obstacle for the efficient functioning 
of secondary reserves market, as in UK and Denmark. On the other hand, in Spain the 
secondary reserve market is finely working since its creation in 1998. 
8.4.2 Incentives for DG/RES to provide AS 
Another relevant issue can be the lack of economic incentives for DG to sell AS when, due to 
support schemes in place, it already receives a higher remuneration for producing as much 
energy as possible with no required controllability, as it happens in Netherlands, Spain or 
UK. In this case as, it was recommended previously, one should avoid support schemes, 
such as fixed feed-in tariffs, providing temporal differentiation.  
8.4.3 Incentives for implementing active networks 
As it has been stated in the section devoted to Active Network Management, none of the 
previous recommendations would be technically feasible without changing the current 
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paradigm of distribution networks by migrating to the more advanced concept of smart grids 
highly automated with much more possibilities for controllability and flexibility. It is clear that 
this deep transformation would require important technological and regulatory changes that 
would span for at least the next 15 to 20 years. Therefore, the full participation of DG 
providing all kind of AS keeping the security of the system is a long-term challenge that can 
be progressively achieved if the recommendations provided in this section are followed in the 
short and medium term. 
8.5 Summary of the recommendations 
In Table 8.2  the main recommendations for the improved functioning of the distribution 
network for coping with large shares of variable RES/DG are summarised. 
Table 8.2. Summary of main recommendations improving tthe functioning of the distribution 
network for efficiently coping with variable RES/DG shares   
Market 
Response 
Barrier 
 
Recommendations 
 
 Short term Medium term Long term 
Shallow 
connection 
charges and 
locationally and 
temporally 
differentiated 
UoS charges 
(NL, D, SP) 
Incompatibility with 
national regulation 
(NL, D, SP) 
Introducing major 
changes in 
electricity laws 
Produce the same 
effect through the 
modification of 
DG/RES support 
payments 
  
Volatility of charges 
(NL)  
Application of 
zonal distribution 
charges updated 
periodically 
 
Use of DSO 
incentives for 
active network 
management 
(SP, NL, UK, D, 
DK) 
Difficulty in 
computing the effect 
of DG on quality of 
service and losses 
(NL, UK, D, DK) 
 
 
Use of reference 
network models 
to estimate the 
impact that DG 
will have on 
performance 
targets.  
Use of extra 
specific 
performance 
indexes, like the 
penetration of 
DG in the area 
 
 
 
Lack of incentives to 
develop the required 
technology (D, NL, 
R&D costs included 
in asset base with a 
higher rate of return 
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SP, DK) or with partial pass-
through to tariffs to 
reduce risks 
Extension of the 
regulatory period 
before passing 
through efficiency 
gains to tariffs 
 
Incentives for 
DSOs to 
consider DG in 
network planning 
Difficulty of 
determining allowed 
capex revenues 
considering DG and 
X factor (SP, NL) 
 
Determination by 
the regulator of 
remuneration 
level in each 
period based on 
reference 
network models 
+ DSO allowed 
to keep all 
revenues in that 
period from 
efficiency gains  
 
 
Incompatibility 
between support 
schemes and 
controllability of 
DG/RES (SP, NL) 
Avoid support 
schemes that 
encourage DG to 
produce as much 
as possible (fixed 
FITs). Use FITs or 
premiums with 
temporal 
differentiation 
 
Provision of  
DSO AS by DG 
Lack of market 
liquidity of AS 
markets (UK, D)  
Allow flexibility in the participation of 
DG in AS: implement bilateral markets 
with the TSO/DSO; allow their 
participation in centralized markets, 
regulated payments, etc. 
 
 
Lack of incentives 
for DG to provide 
these services (UK, 
NL, SP) 
Avoid support schemes that encourage 
DG to produce as much as possible 
(fixed FITs). Use FITs or premiums with 
temporal differentiation 
 
 
Difficulty of 
changing the 
network operation 
paradigm (to ANM) 
 Incentives for DSOs to implement ANM previously explained 
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9 Conclusion 
9.1 Electricity liberalisation and technology choice 
An important argument for the electricity liberalisation in the 1980s and 1990s was that the 
change in the institutional structure of the electricity supply industry would create an market 
dynamics that was necessary to overcome the “national monopolies and their high 
rents/profits” increase economic efficient of industry, i.e. by mitigating barriers for new 
generators and suppliers to enter the electricity market, which was seen by some as a barrier 
for more contributions of new and more environmental-friendly generation technologies. Spot 
and balancing markets are now found all over Europe, and these markets are developing 
continuously to meet the needs of the electricity system, including the newly upcoming  
intermittent and distributed power generation technologies. 
Despite the liberalization process that has taken place in most systems, several barriers still 
lie in the way of implementing market responses aimed at favouring the integration of 
distributed and renewable technologies. This report has put forward some measures that 
should help overcome these barriers in those countries where the latter are perceived as real 
obstacles. Measures have been classified according to the barrier they are addressed at, the 
time horizon when they would become applicable, and whether their application should be 
coordinated in the different countries or not. The following paragraphs provide an overview of 
the main recommendations that have been identified and discussed in the main text. 
9.2 Main recommendations 
Increasing the flexibility of relevant conventional generation options: Hydro power 
with reservoirs and gas fired plants 
Hydro power – in particular with reservoirs – is the generation technology that is best suited 
to respond to intermittent generation. Among the five countries Spain has a significant share 
of hydro power in most parts of the country. The generating capacity is large, but the amount 
of energy may be limited in dry periods. In Denmark and the Netherlands there is very little 
domestic hydro power, but Denmark has a long tradition for trade with countries with an 
abundance of hydro power. Besides this, the use of hydro reservoirs and required 
transmission lines may be enhanced by adding pumping facilities. 
Power generation by gas fired plants is also very important when balancing 
scheduled/unscheduled variations of wind power and other intermittent technologies. Hydro 
resources tend not to be large enough to carry out this back up function in most systems. 
Contribution of gas plants to the back-up system capacity will increase in the future as a 
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consequence of the fact that the hydro power potential is already fully exploited in most 
European countries. 
Construction of additional transmission capacity  
Transmission capacity in most EU systems has traditionally been relatively large. However, 
significant increases in transmission capacity may be needed to cope with the variability of 
wind power. Further interconnection capacity between Norway and Denmark, on the one 
hand, and Netherlands and Germany, on the other, is being built or is planned. Spain is also 
working to increase the interconnection capacity with its neighbours. Further expansion of 
the transmission capacity is recommended by the RESPOND project, and to existing 
reservoirs will enhance the capability to accommodate additional intermittent generation. 
Use of heat distribution infrastructure and heat storages 
Water-based heat distribution systems are necessary for the use of heat storages to be used 
in CHP units for flexible operation to respond to intermittent generation. These systems are 
widely different in size – from radiator systems in individual homes, heat supply in 
greenhouses or industries using heat or steam in different temperatures to district heating 
systems ranging from villages or blocks of flats to large interconnected urban district heating 
networks as in Berlin or Copenhagen.  
Support schemes for micro CHP units mainly for individual homes are considered in the 
RESPOND project. There is a significant potential for this technology in the UK and the 
Netherlands, which may replace gas-fired heat-only boilers. It is recommended that units 
designed for on-off operation with heat storage should be encouraged as standard for mass 
production (e.g. 3 kW electric), rather than very small units (e.g. 1 kW) for continuous 
operation, which will follow the current heat requirement.  
However, micro CHP is recommended only for the very small-scale heat distribution 
systems. If larger heat distribution systems are created, more flexibility will be added to 
respond to intermittent generation. So, the preferred recommendation is to establish larger 
heat distribution systems by interconnecting existing systems. This will allow the penetration 
of larger and more efficient CHP units, which can use fuels other than gas – in particular 
biomass. Larger heat distribution systems or district heating systems offer a range of options 
for flexibility that is needed by the electricity system, e.g. electric boilers for down-regulation, 
or electric heat pumps for heat base load, which may be cut off, when up-regulation of 
electricity is needed.  
Response by peak load units 
Installation of peak-load units, e.g. gas turbines to respond to the variability and 
unpredictability of intermittent generation is recommended only when the response from 
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hydro power, CHP systems or larger gas fuelled units operating at intermediate load is 
insufficient.  
Commercial aggregators 
Aggregation of units is the key recommendation for operating an electric system with many 
small units. Commercial aggregators with a portfolio of similar units, e.g. wind turbines, or 
complementary units of different technologies should play a key role both in the basic energy 
supply and the provision of system services. Aggregators can also overcome size limitations 
on the day-ahead, intraday, balancing or ancillary services markets. Instruments and 
software such as ‘virtual power plants’ are being developed to be used by aggregators for 
control of their portfolio of different generation technologies and operation on the spot and 
balancing markets. 
Geographical price areas for spot and balancing markets 
In all countries there is a day-ahead market, which is the key instrument to generate price 
signals for generators with controllable technologies as well as consumers who are able to 
adjust their demand to price signals. These markets have been developed significantly in 
recent years. Cross-border market coupling was established early in the Nordic region and 
recently between the Netherlands, Belgium and France, leading to more efficient price 
setting and trade within a region. In most regions of Europe, existing price areas follow 
national boundaries. This is not efficient in large countries with a large penetration of wind 
power and bottlenecks in the transmission system. Splitting national markets into price areas 
that reflect these constraints have been practiced in the Nordic region for more than a 
decade. This leads to prices that reflect the expected amount of supply of wind power in 
each area, among other variables influencing the energy dispatch. In some hours zero prices 
have occurred, when wind production exceeds local demand, and even a negative price floor 
is being introduced in Germany and Denmark. To get the right price signals for generators 
and consumers, it is becoming increasingly important that the geographical price areas for 
the day-ahead market reflect the pattern of wind variations and transmission constraints.  
Market splitting into price areas will also lead to more transparency concerning the need for 
new transmission capacity. Large and frequent price differences between neighbouring price 
areas clearly indicate the need for new transmission lines. 
Pricing for encouraging Demand response and Active Network Management 
With price signals in place that reflect the hourly variations in energy supply conditions in a 
geographical area, it is recommended that all customers face these prices, as soon as hourly 
metering is established. This is a necessary incentive for the consumers to adjust their 
demands according to system needs. This is also required to avoid cross subsidisation from 
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customers with most consumption in cheap hours to consumers with most consumption in 
expensive hours. 
In addition, it is recommended that the information from hourly meters is used by the DSOs 
for developing methods for active network management. is used by the DSOs when 
implementing methods for Active Network Management (ANM). The application of ANM 
techniques should have an impact both on the planning and operation stages of the 
management of distribution systems. Both demand and distributed generation should receive 
incentives to participate in ANM schemes. 
Larger consumers are more able to respond on price signal and may even enter interuptibility 
contracts or take part in the day-ahead or intraday market. In particular, the cooling market 
can be further developed with centralised facilities for air-conditioning. When electrical 
vehicles are introduced it is recommended that charge and discharge of batteries are 
controlled centrally or by means of price signals. 
In the final RESPOND report D8 all relevant measures and regulatory changes and 
improvement will be put in an time frame to secure a smooth and efficient transition of the 
power system in each of the five EU countries, each with different system conditions and 
needs for dealing with high intermittency RES/DG generation in the next decades. 
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Appendix A. Market results for Western 
Denmark 2006-2008 
The generation from wind power in the price area Western Denmark covers about 25 percent 
of the electricity consumption on an annual basis. This is currently the largest share of wind 
power for any price area within an electricity spot market. Detailed market data are available 
from energinet.dk since 2000. From 2006 all price data are available in EUR/MWh. The 
maximum hourly demand in all the three years 2006, 2007 and 2008 was about 3.8 GW, and 
the maximum wind production was about 2.2 GW,  
Strong interconnections between Western Denmark and other regions (up to 1.7 GW for 
import to Northern Germany with very similar conditions for wind power, and 1.7 GW 
transmission capacity to Norway and Sweden with little wind capacity and large hydro 
storage capability) will reduce the number of events with consecutive hours with high prices 
due to lack of generation from wind. Thus, the number of these hours was small in both 2006 
and 2007 (see Table A.1). When spot prices were high, forecasts of generation from wind 
turbines were reasonable, and regulations after market closure were insignificant.  
In Denmark, balancing is maintained within the framework of the joint Nordic regulating 
power market together with national balancing responsible parties, and rules and regulations 
set by the TSO.  
In the Danish market, like in the rest of the Nordic markets, there is no particular Ancillary 
Services market. However, the price mechanism of day-ahead market divide the Nord Pool 
area into price areas, which reflects bottlenecks among the regions (Finland, Sweden, 
Norway divided into three or more regions, Denmark East and West, and the KONTEK link 
between Denmark and Germany). Any company controlling a portfolio of electricity 
generation or demand may become a participant on the Elspot market. The responsibility for 
the company’s balance must be taken care of directly or indirectly through a balance 
agreement with the TSO, in the area in which trading takes place. 
The variations in the hourly area price for Western Denmark are analysed in Table A.1 for 
the three years 2006, 2007 and 2008. The available infrastructure was nearly the same in all 
the three years, only the transmission capacity between Western Denmark and Germany has 
been increased. Table A.1 shows that the number of hours with extreme area prices, below 5 
€/MWh or above 100 €/MWh, is quite small. 
 
 
 
 91
Table A.1. Prices in Nord Pool price area Western Denmark 
  2006  2007  2008
Nord Pool System price, €/MWh  49.01  29.09  45.74
Area price €/MWh  45.81  34.82  58.33
EEX price, €/MWh  55.04  41.93  69.89
Area price >10 € lower than system price  1799  444  163
Hours below 5 €/MWh  80  185  63
Area price >10 € higher than system price  458  1691  4066
Hours above 100 €/MWh 11  105  293
Hours above 200 €/MWh 0  26  0
Hours above 400 €/MWh 0  5  0
2 or more consecutive hours above 100 €/MWh, events 2  25  34
3 or more consecutive hours above 100 €/MWh, events 1  16  21
6 or more consecutive hours above 100 €/MWh, events 0  2  9
Wind production above 100 % of consumption, hours 27  50  43 
Wind production below 10 % of consumption, hours 381  371  352 
Above 100 €/MWh and wind production below 10 % of consumption, 
hours  7  8  12 
12 or more consecutive hours with wind production below 10 % of 
consumption, events  13  9  7 
Highest number of consecutive hours with wind production below 10 % of 
consumption  40  76  25 
Above 100 €/MWh and up‐regulation more than 20 % higher. hours 1  5  22
Down‐regulation negative price, hours  201  137  46 
Up‐regulation above 100 €/MWh, hours  68  204  585 
Up‐regulation above 200 €/MWh, hours  1  65  120 
Elbas (intraday market): Price quotations, Elbas, hours (from April 2007) 0  1070  1834
Elbas: Difference more than 10 € to area price, hours  0  132  622 
Southbound transit, hours  1722  4025  5098 
Northbound transit, hours  3324  1091  538 
Transit between Sweden and Norway, hours  2130  2678  2634 
Export from DK‐West to all neighbours, hours  1554  849  342 
Import to DK‐West from all neighbours, hours  29  116  171 
The production from the same wind turbine capacity was 20 % higher in 2007 than in 2006 
and in-between in 2008. 2006 was a dry year in Norway and Sweden, leading to import from 
Denmark, while 2007 and 2008 have been more wet years with export to Denmark and 
further to Germany. However, the much higher prices in 2008 are reflecting the much higher 
EUA (CO2 allowances) prices in 2008 than the almost zero price level for 2007.  
Figure A.1 shows the number of “extreme” hours in 2007. However, the criteria for extreme 
hours selected was quite modest.  
Currently, low supply from wind is not critical for Western Denmark, but problems may occur 
in the future, if the existing thermal capacity will be reduced. Limited supply from wind (here 
defined as 10 % of consumption or less than half of the annual average) is found in about 4 
% of all hours. However, most of those hours are consecutive, so short-term storages will be 
of little help. Longer periods (e.g. 12 hours or more) with little or now wind will occur roughly 
once a month. The longest period with low wind that was found during the three years was 
76 hours in November 2007. 
Two or more  hours > 100 €/MWh
Single hours > 100 €/MWh
Up regulation > 100 €/MWh
Wind production above  
consumption
 
Figure A.1 Western Denmark. Extreme hours 2007 
During the worst storm in recent years (Saturday 8 January 2005) some 2000 MW wind 
turbines in Western Denmark stopped due to wind speeds more than 25 m/s of mean wind. 
The TSO had to buy large amounts of regulation power. During the night the area spot and 
regulation prices had been zero, but prices were not abnormal during the outage of the wind 
capacity. Thus, the combined spot and balancing market was able to handle this particular 
event. However, by chance this was a Saturday with lower demand than weekdays.  
The intraday market, Elbas, with continuous trade and closure time one hour before delivery 
was not introduced in Western Denmark until April 2007. It mainly works as a mechanism for 
fine tuning of the day-ahead prices. In 2008 there was price quotations for Western Denmark 
in about 20 % of the time. However, this market was designed to meet the requirements of 
large-electricity consuming industries, rather than the challenges of wind energy. It was 
originally introduced in Finland in 1996 (EL-EX) and shortly after merged with Nord Pool with 
trade also in Sweden and later Eastern Denmark and parts of Germany.  
The balancing market is far more significant for handling of intermittent generation than the 
intraday market. The balancing market seems not very important when the day-ahead area 
prices are high. On the other hand, there is a significant number of hours with ‘normal’ prices 
on the day-ahead market and up-regulation prices more than 100 €/MWh higher.  
Table A.1 also show that there are a number of hours with negative down-regulation prices, 
although the number of hours has been significantly reduced from 2006 to 2008. These 
negative prices are due to high start and stop costs of decentralized CHP generation in 
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Denmark. Also down regulation by using electricity in electric boilers in district heating 
systems may lead to negative prices.  
The balancing market is used to handle imbalances within the price area of Western 
Denmark. This will not be sufficient, if the wind capacity is increased much further.  
In the short term negative prices on the spot market are considered as the most important 
additional measure to address the challenge of the large amount of intermittent generation. 
Negative prices have already been introduced on the German EEX spot market, and from 
October 2009 a negative price floor at -200 €/MWh will be introduced by Nord Pool, which 
will be significant mainly for Denmark 
In its System Plan 2007 the Danish TSO, Energinet.dk will explore most of the measures 
addressed in the RESPOND project to address the challenge from intermittent generation, 
such as “combining means, including steps to regulate wind turbine electricity generation, expand the 
transmission grid, use heat pumps, electric boilers, alternative connecting points and wind farm 
locations, demand response, electric cars, etc.”  
Western Denmark was ‘born’ as a price area within Nord Pool. However, in addition to the 
measures mentioned above, Energinet.dk in considering dividing Western Denmark into two 
price areas: 
 “In principle, the internal overload problems in the West Danish electricity transmission grid can be 
solved by introducing new bidding and price areas in Western Denmark. This will ensure that the 
exchange between the areas does not exceed the physical limitations of the system, as the trading 
capacity between the areas is defined on the basis of the potential for physical exchange. (...) 
Unless the other means, as described above, are activated to such an extent that grid overload 
problems are eliminated, dividing Western Denmark into two price areas must be regarded as the only 
legitimate and realistic method for handling internal capacity restrictions”. 
This measure complies with the general recommendations for the Nord Pool exchange area 
that temporally imbalances should be met by counter trade, while permanent ones should be 
met by price areas. However, this recommendation has been practised in Norway only.  
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